1
研究报告
研究报告
盘古智库国际形势月报2017年6月(总第5期)(中英文版)




 

 

盘古智库

国际形势月报

2017年6月(总第5期)

特朗普的中东外交

跨大西洋关系的松动

美国退出《巴黎协定》掀起的波澜

第二次“习特会”前的中美关系

中东酝酿的新风暴

英国的“黑六月”

执笔人:安刚 盘古智库高级研究员

 


 

特朗普“囫囵吞枣”的中东政策

美国在中东的最主要盟友沙特荣幸地成为唐纳德·特朗普总统首次外访的首站。在美国历史上,还从来没有一位新总统把入主白宫后的首次出访目的地锁定在欧洲或美洲以外的地方,特立独行的特朗普开创了又一先例。在这次酝酿了足足三个多月的出访中,特朗普还踏足以色列、巴勒斯坦。


特朗普政府在外交方面对中东事务的重视早有迹象。特朗普就职以后,已在白宫接待以色列、沙特、阿联酋、巴勒斯坦、埃及等中东北非国家领导人或王室要员,并与他们通过电话保持密切联系。通过这些接触,特朗普不仅快速“学习”中东事务,而且开始尝试编织新政府的中东外交。


尽管特朗普的本意是推动美国从中东乱局中抽身,减少对外战略资源的过度铺张,专注于反恐和推动以巴和谈两件事,但他的安全、外交团队和军事顾问班底里充斥着富有中东经历的高官,他们认为奥巴马政府的中东政策过于理想主义、疏远以色列、把机会空间让给俄罗斯,决心扭转美国在中东的“颓势”。这就在特朗普政府内部形成了既延续共和党人关注犹太利益集团的传统、又在中东外交的实际运作中谨慎对待该地区复杂性的倾向。


初具轮廓的特朗普中东政策有五方面内容。第一,主张美国不应在中东继续卷入政权更迭、政治重建这样费力不讨好的事,而要集中精力消灭“伊斯兰国”等极端势力,这与特朗普内外政策的“美国优先”原则相一致。第二,收回不再坚持以“两国方案”推动和谈的姿态,收敛对以扩建定居点的暧昧态度,搁置把美驻以使馆迁往耶路撒冷的考虑,着手与中东盟友协商推动中东和平进程的纲要。第三,对伊朗强硬,也对伊试射导弹追加单边制裁,但未敢如竞选期间宣扬的那样撕毁伊朗核协议,准备见机行事。第四,重整与沙特等中东盟友的军事安全合作关系,换取中东金主对特朗普国内基建等经济计划的资金支持。第五,针对伊斯兰世界部分国家收紧移民签证政策,以达到减少国土安全隐患和保护本土就业机会之双重目的。


4月特朗普以叙利亚政府军对反政府武装和平民动用化学武器为由批准美国海军向叙政府军空军基地实施“外科手术式”军事打击,行动后又戛然而止以免“陷入”叙利亚。这一决断在美国国内为特朗普赢得赞誉,但也中断了美对叙政策向放弃推翻阿萨德政权目标调整的趋势,中止了美俄利用中东问题改善关系的机会。


特朗普在2017年5月底进行的首次中东之访,逻辑线条与上述特点保持一致。在沙特,特朗普同海湾合作委员会6个成员国和大约50个阿拉伯和伊斯兰国家的领导人举行“阿拉伯-伊斯兰-美国峰会”,发表长篇演讲,强调中东国家必须团结起来变得强大,而不能坐等美国来消灭敌人。特朗普明确了美国与中东国家联合反恐行动的三重目标:一是各国确保本国领土不成为恐怖分子的活动场所,二是截断恐怖分子资金来源,三是切断“伊斯兰国”和石油贩卖和金融网络。特朗普也严厉批评了伊朗,称伊朗助长“教派间冲突和恐怖的火焰”,出资为“扩散破坏和混乱”的武装分子提供武器和培训,鼓吹如果伊朗不与国际社会合作,所有“有良知的国家”必须团结一致孤立它。


沙特之行,特朗普拿出两项反恐“实际行动”:与沙特达成总额超过1000亿美元的军售协议,该一揽子协议可能持续10年,最终实现金额可能超过3000亿美元;宣布在沙特成立“打击极端主义意识形态全球中心”和“打击恐怖主义金融中心”。


在以色列,特朗普着力渲染美以特殊盟友关系的“牢不可破”,确认了任内与以共同应对“伊斯兰国”恐怖组织、共同阻止伊朗成为有核国家和推动以巴达成和平协议的对以政策三重目标。“闪电式”访以期间,特朗普只字不提其曾在竞选期间渲染的将美驻以使馆搬迁到耶路撒冷的考虑。


在约旦河西岸城市伯利恒仅半天的停留中,特朗普向巴勒斯坦领导人阿巴斯重申将竭尽全力帮助巴以达成“历史性的和平协议”,但也许是为了照顾以色列的情绪,面对媒体又对如何实现和平含糊其辞,阿巴斯则再次表明和平协议须以“两国方案”为基础,呼吁以色列承认巴勒斯坦国。


特朗普的首次中东之行向世界展示了美国新政府对这一地区的重视,然而并不能把过去几个月已经呈现的政策线索拼合成一幅更清晰的图景。迄今为止,特朗普的中东外交仍然只是就事论事的“碎片”,缺乏整体性,难以成事。


特朗普的中东外交明确了“伊斯兰国”是美国在中东头号敌人和最主要安全威胁,试图把大多数穆斯林和一小撮极端势力区分开来,针对“伊斯兰国”的军事行动也确实在取得一些成果,然而只要美国不能采取有效措施消除恐怖主义滋生的土壤,它和它的盟友就将不断受到安全滋扰。


特朗普的中东外交明确了伊朗是美国在中东主要地缘战略利益挑战者,试图延续自小布什时期明朗化的扶持逊尼派打压什叶派的思路,支持沙特等盟友与伊朗对抗,但伊朗作为一个地区大国自有其精明之处,其战略触角在东西两个方向上同时延伸,极力拓展自己的回旋空间,应对美国并不被动。


特朗普的中东外交具有超强的务实性,既要在中东推进美国军火商的利益,又要向中东盟友收取保护费,还要诱使中东盟友大举投资美国,无异于开出了完全失衡的“帐单”,难以聚拢人心,遑论构筑“中东版北约”。


事实不断表明,对于中东外交,在国内政治需要与地区战略设计发生冲突时,特朗普会断然选择前者,空袭叙利亚便是例证。特朗普的中东和平计划尚未成形,但已蓄势待发,这项工作以往的美国总统出发得都要早,打破了历任总统到任期末才全力推动以巴和谈的“惯例”,应该是想吸取他们动手太晚功败垂成的“教训”,提早布局,以提高“青史留名”的胜算。特朗普的中东外交提前预定了任内推动以巴和谈取得实质进展的目标,然而同时面对内塔尼亚胡政府这个以色列历史上最保守的政府和阿巴斯这个实权较弱的巴勒斯坦领袖,要在总体偏向以色列的前提下填补以巴信任赤字几乎是不可能的。

 

跨大西洋关系从根基上发生松动

 

“我们能彼此完全信任的时代在一定程度上已经过去了”,“我们欧洲人必须真正掌握自身的命运”,“为我们自己的未来而奋斗”。这是德国总理默克尔5月28日在慕尼黑的一次竞选集会演讲中谈到过去数日出席七国集团意大利峰会感受时针对美欧关系现状发表的言论,因在一个啤酒棚发表,又称“啤酒棚讲话”(Bierzeltrede)。这段话无异于宣告美国总统特朗普刚刚结束的欧洲之旅在打通新时期的美欧关系方面成果寥寥。


特朗普5月底首次外访的后半段行程在欧洲进行,先是访问意大利、梵蒂冈,接着出席在比利时布鲁塞尔举行的北约峰会和在意大利西西里岛举行的七国集团峰会。尽管所到之处,各方给予特朗普最高的礼遇和足够的镜头曝光,然而在不同议题上的巨大分歧,这次欧洲之行被特朗普演绎成一场“尴尬之旅”。


从与教皇方济各会晤时特朗普及其家人笑得灿若桃花、教皇却一脸无奈,到北约峰会领导人合影时特朗普一把推开黑山共和国总理在摄像机前摆出“我才是老大”的傲慢姿态,再到在美国驻比利时使馆会晤法国新总统马克龙时两人“硬汉式”握手角力,特朗普这些用美国媒体话讲“入乡随俗但又反客为主”的肢体语言几乎完全转移、冲淡了人们对他访欧内容的关注。


在特朗普看来,他访欧的主要目的是要在对欧外交中充分体现他的“美国优先”原则,渲染美国对欧洲的“领导者”地位,而不是巩固美西方伙伴关系、追求“美欧一家亲”效果,这样就可以对美国国内支持他的人群有所交代,向美国国内传递他在内在外都是一个“强有力的美国总统”的信号,特别是在他的执政地位已开始受到“通俄门”、人事内斗等丑闻冲击的情况下。


特朗普在与马克龙餐叙时刻意强调他是支持对方参选总统的,然而这无法抹掉特朗普在竞选期间与法国极右翼领导人勒庞隔洋互掷“好感”的记录。在今年以来欧洲的一系列选举中,极右主义开始受到阻击,其与美国、俄罗斯的保守主义思潮合流的趋势明显减缓,欧洲自由主义旗帜的“最后高擎者”德国总理默克尔似乎也在寻求第四次连任的道路上越来越胜券在握,特朗普作为美国的实际领导者不得不从现实政治出发掩盖、调整其支持欧洲与美国一道“右化”的立场。


在与欧盟和北约国家领导人的集体会面中,特朗普一边嘲讽北约新大楼“很漂亮”,一边批评各国没有主动拿出足够的国防费,声称这对美国纳税人“不公平”,要求北约各国切实兑现“将国防费与国内生产总值(GDP)的比率提高至2%”的承诺。


也许是为配合施压,出席北约首脑会议的美国总统破天荒地没有明确重申恪守北约共同防御原则,还暗有所指地带去一块世贸中心北楼残片作为“见面礼”。正是16年前的“9·11”事件触发北约成员首次启用《北大西洋公约》第五条《共同防御条约》,该条约规定了任何针对北约成员国的攻击被视为对所有其他成员国的攻击。


七国集团峰会同意继续加强反恐、继续制裁俄罗斯并对朝鲜保持压力,在安全问题上似乎保持了合作基调,但特朗普坚持不接受欧洲在气候变化问题上的立场,双方产生了冲突,白宫随即宣布将在特朗普返美后一周内就美国是否退出《巴黎协定》做出最终决策。


七国集团峰会尽管同意反对保护主义并共同努力改善世界贸易组织的运行,但美欧围绕贸易问题的分歧仍然巨大。特朗普在会见欧盟委员会主席容克和欧洲理事会主席图斯克时抱怨德国“很坏、很坏”、向美国市场投放大量汽车的只言片语被媒体录到,引发了美德之间新的外交摩擦。


从国内政治角度看,特朗普的欧洲之行是“成功”的,但从美欧关系角度看,正如德国电视一台评论本次七国集团峰会时所说的,“几乎成为一场溃败”。可以看出,对特朗普而言,欧洲并不是他必须优先耕耘的外交重点,欧洲在他的外交图表上没有长期战略规划可言,只意味着短期利益。


欧洲仍是美国本土反恐的屏障,美欧安全和防务合作的重点将在特朗普任内进一步向防恐反恐转移,并与特朗普政府正着力开拓的美国与中东盟友反恐合作相接轨。


特朗普认定美国对欧洲防务责任过重,必须推动欧洲分担责任。这已成为特朗普政府欧安全政策的“教旨”,横在美欧适应国际形势新变化调整防务合作道路上的鸿沟,也是欧洲日益确信美国不再可靠的主要依据。


欧洲、特别是德国代表的“工业欧洲”,是特朗普心目中的美国贸易竞争对手、外贸逆差主要来源之一,特朗普向选民兑现“买美国货、雇美国人”承诺必须在对欧贸易方面得到兑现。今后一个时期贸易摩擦将是美欧关系的一大“罩门”。


特朗普政府在退出《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》(TPP)后尚未决定对谈判已近尾声的“跨大西洋贸易与投资伙伴协议”(TTIP)的政策,总体倾向是继续商谈,然而欧洲方面对特朗普政府信心匮乏,不愿重置有关谈判,美方是否还需做出务实调整取决于美欧经济关系总体氛围向何处去。


特朗普改善对俄关系的计划因“通俄门”丑闻被全面冻结,因此无法绕开欧盟实施对俄外交和处理乌克兰、叙利亚、伊朗等问题,将不能自行其是,也就不得不在有关方面奉行更为务实的政策,立场向欧洲靠拢。


特朗普对欧洲大陆继续由自由主义主导不满,将日益分开处理与英国和欧盟的关系,突出英国在其对欧外交中的地位,美英关系将在其任内有新的实质性发展,而这又会反向鼓励英国脱欧进程,继续影响欧盟的内在改革动力和极右民粹主义发展势头。


对欧洲而言,特朗普代表着“另一个美国”。美国在欧洲统一和安全方面的承诺是否仍然有效,维系美欧乃至整个西方世界 “团结”的价值观是否已经断裂,将是今后数年欧洲不得不重新思考和认识的根本性问题。可以预计,“走自己的路”意识将在欧洲更加高涨。欧洲将在尽量维护对美合作关系的同时,努力探索自己的务实外交之道,更加注重拓展全方位的伙伴关系,从此意义上讲中国与欧洲关系所面临的机遇应以中长期计量。

美国退出《巴黎协定》掀波澜

6月1日,美国总统特朗普宣布美国退出《巴黎协定》。联合国气候变化公约框架下的《巴黎协定》是2015年12月12日在巴黎气候变化大会上历经各方艰苦谈判最终达成的,2016年4月22日在纽约联合国总部签署。该协定为2020年后全球应对气候变化行动提供国际法依据,各方根据本国实际情况就各自减排份额和时间表做出承诺。


斡旋促成并签署《巴黎协定》是特朗普前任奥巴马总统的核心政治和外交遗产,奉行自由主义价值观的奥巴马政府以推广清洁能源、推动美国能源改革为己任。《巴黎协定》同时也是中美为人类共同应对全球性挑战开展协调合作的重要象征和结晶。2016年9月3日,中国国家主席习近平和美国总统奥巴马在杭州先后向联合国秘书长潘基文交存气候变化《巴黎协定》批准文书。


特朗普竞选期间,把废除《巴黎协定》对美国的“束缚”作为自己的政纲之一大肆宣扬,引起国际社会深切关注。特朗普上台后,尽管并未采取立即退约的措施,但签署总统令取消了奥巴马政府的“清洁能源计划”,还大幅缩减环保署编制和预算。奥巴马“清洁能源计划”计划的主要内容是履行在全球巴黎气候变化协定框架内的义务,到2030年将美国发电厂碳排放目标在2005年基础上减少32%。


特朗普在气候变化问题上之所以态度消极,一方面是其政治右倾、与自由主义阵营和建制派群体对立的重要表现,一方面有着深厚的经济利益驱动。特朗普的内外政策奉行“美国优先”原则,施政的主要目标之一利用吸引制造业回流、减少外贸逆差、节省发展成本、助推能源消费等多种手段并用,达到刺激经济快速增长的短期效果,以保持中下阶层民意支持,巩固自己的执政地位。特朗普背后有着庞大的传统能源利益集团,他们认为清洁能源计划增加美国的经济增长成本,抑制中低端制造业复苏和回流,坚决主张废除有关国际承诺。


特朗普做出退出《巴黎协定》的决定,是今年国际政治当中的重大事件,其影响绝不仅限于气候变化领域,而将是多方位的。这有可能是美国真正开启“新孤立主义”时代的起点,这个国家退出国际义务转而趋向保守和自私将成为长期化的现象,除非特朗普政府“短命”,或者有什么内外因素聚集到一起强大到足以迫使特朗普政府主动采取纠错措施。


美国国内已十分高涨的反特朗普情绪将被特朗普的退约之举彻底激怒,不仅两党“政治极化”的现象更加严重,自由派、建制派对特特朗普的“政治报复”也会更为凶狠。


由于美国“核心观念”的转变,气候变化问题在美欧之间已由共同利益和价值观的维系点变为主要的外交摩擦领域。特朗普的退约决定触碰美欧关系的“底线”,美国与大陆欧洲的关系将更为冷淡,共同语言进一步减少,而这终将对双方的相互信任和共同战略利益基础造成侵蚀,修复起来需要隔代的努力。


就气候变化问题本身而言,美国退出《巴黎协定》意味着,碳排放量每年约占全球份额17%之多的美国明确放弃了对气候治理领导权的追求,同时将大幅削减国际气候援助。尽管美国部分地方州市和新经济企业反对特朗普政府的决定,坚持遵守《巴黎协定》,但美国作为一个整体已不可能全面履行减排承诺,其温室气体排放至多只能部分实现国家自主减排贡献(NDC)。《巴黎协定》的权威性和有效性将大为受损,接下来各方都将不得不重新考虑自己对协定承诺的严肃性问题,美国造成的连带示范效应将非常恶劣,最终增加实现《巴黎协定》温控2℃目标的难度和成本。


由于美国的退约,中国的排放空间将被压缩,减排负担和成本将增加,中美气候合作在中美关系中的支柱作用也将明显弱化,但可能会加大中国在可再生能源开发领域相对于美国的领先优势。我们应当认真考虑的关键问题有两个:第一,美国退出了《巴黎协定》,留在协定里的中国该怎么办,是继续履约作“负责任的大国”?还是可以有所保留?在这个问题上,可以说全世界都在看着中国,各方在很大程度上将根据中国的反应决定自己的反应。第二,当美国一道接一道地启动自己从国际体系不同领域“领导者”岗位上“退出”的程序,中国是不是要接过手来?中国到没到可以这样做的时候,有没有实力这样做?


以上两个关键性的问题,需要全方位的分析和评估。有一点应可肯定:中国不应因美国毁弃应对气候变化的承诺而改变自己建设建设生态文明、走绿色发展道路的规划,这是党的十八大提出的明确目标,也是国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划的重要内容,事关国计民生,事关国家和民族的持久竞争力,动摇不得,退缩不得,反复不得。

 

上海合作组织扩员

 

6月9日,上海合作组织成员国元首理事会第十七次会议在哈萨克斯坦首都阿斯塔纳举行。随着巴基斯坦和印度被正式接纳为新成员,上合组织正式成员国由六国增加到八国,地域范围已经延展至南亚,成为世界上幅员广、人口多、潜力大的地区性国际组织,合作空间得到拓展,合作层次得到提升,同时也为中国与印巴两国的双边关系发展提供了新的平台和场所。


但印巴之间根深蒂固的战略疑虑和安全摩擦也使上合组织创始成员方产生担忧:两国会不会把彼此矛盾和争吵带入上合组织,从而增加组织运作和机制决策的复杂性。应该说,这种担忧并非没有根据。印巴两国在其同属的南亚次区域合作平台上尚且水火不容,又能否做到在其它区域场合把彼此争议搁在一边,齐心参与多边合作?


上合组织从安全合作起步,特别是在地区反恐方面卓有建树,已经摸索出一套行之有效、授益诸边的合作方式。危及各国安全的恐怖主义祸患在中亚、南亚地区是连片发展的,与中东相呼应形成了一道极端势力影响的“走廊”。印巴两国均深受恐怖主义和宗教极端势力之害,有关风险和挑战已经直接关乎两国的国运。有了印巴的实质性参与以及两国对上合反恐原则的接受和遵守,上合反恐合作的效果将从根子上得到加强,印巴两国也将深受其益。


上合组织合作正在向经贸、人文等领域加速拓展,对印巴产生日益强大的吸引力。通过上合组织合作,或许可以引导印巴两国另辟蹊径,帮助它们找到一种绕开彼此纠葛、跳出自身所在地区局限,找到发展共赢的感觉,进而引发它们对双边关系的反思。那样的话,调解南亚内部紧张关系而努力的各方有望达到多年苦苦追寻而求之不得的“柳暗花明”。


上合组织必须在相互磨合的过程中有耐心的运筹和精细的操作,各方都需要展现清晰而明确的大局观。对与印巴均保持重要关系的中方来说,在上合框架内协调印巴关系,将是中国在更广范围内、更多问题上发挥斡旋调解作用的重要试验场。

 

中美外交安全对话举行

 

作为落实习近平主席与特朗普总统2017年4月海湖庄园会晤成果的一项重要行动,首轮中美外交安全对话6月21日在华盛顿举行。中国国务委员杨洁篪同美国国务卿蒂勒森、国防部长马蒂斯共同主持,中国中央军委委员、中央军委联合参谋部参谋长房峰辉参加。


这次对话巩固了两国元首的共识,双方均承诺继续共同努力扩大互利合作领域,在相互尊重的基础上管控分歧,推动中美关系长期健康稳定发展。在中方发表的共识清单中,包括就改善两国互动的基本原则进行讨论,在战略安全领域探讨新的建立信任措施。两军关系方面,双方同意认真落实年度交流合作项目,尽早实现两国防长互访、美军参联会主席访华,深化在人道主义救援减灾、反海盗、军事医学等共同领域的合作,致力于落实建立信任措施的谅解备忘录。


6月22日,特朗普总统在白宫会见杨洁篪一行。特朗普表示很高兴看到海湖庄园会晤以来美中各领域合作都取得积极进展,期待通过下阶段高层交往推动美中关系取得新的发展。特朗普也表示美方愿同中方在“一带一路”有关项目上进行合作。


中美外交安全对话是中方与特朗普政府积极互动重新调整两国战略层面对话机制的成果之一,两国年内还将举行全面经济、执法及网络安全、社会和人文等其他三个高级别对话机制的首轮对话。


本次中美外交安全对话也是两国最高层进行更紧密直接互动的铺垫之一。根据双方已基本商定的安排。中美元首将在7月德国汉堡20国集团峰会期间再次会晤,特朗普将应习近平主席的邀请在2017年底首次对华进行国事访问。


4月举行的海湖庄园会终结了中美关系在2016年美国大选后的过渡期里因特朗普接听台湾蔡英文电话、质疑美国的一个中国政策以及在经贸、朝核等问题上发表批评中国言论等产生的颠簸,就中美两个大国不对抗、不冲突、发展互利共赢的伙伴关系达成原则共识,并且重置了两国高层对话机制、启动了百日贸易谈判计划、商定就朝核等地区安全问题加强协商,因而显著提高了人们对中美关系的乐观预期。首次“习特会”后,中美工作层积极落实有关共识,“百日贸易谈判”取得“早期收获”,围绕朝核问题的沟通至少阻止了朝鲜进行新的核试和远程导弹发射。在今年5月北京“一带一路”国际合作高峰论坛期间,特朗普政府派出了白宫国安会中层官员出席,显示了美方在国际秩序变革层面对华防范猜忌心态的调整。


随着中美关系的回暖,两国地方和企业层面看到了双方改革发展战略对接所蕴涵的机遇,相互投资交往意愿重新趋于活跃。今年6月“2017选择美国”峰会在华盛顿举行期间中国代表团是所有国家中最大的,有来自不同产业的150多个投资方。美国的创新、农业、能源产业和金融服务业对拓展中国市场正重新燃起希望。


中方与美国新政府相互重视、有效联系模式的确立大大消减了两国关系的不确定性,为双方合作的延续和分歧的管控创造了比较好的条件。但这不等于中美关系风险不再,一些分歧摩擦点仍有随中美关系和国际地区形势发展变化而在特定时点重新升温的可能。


首先,朝核问题仍然无解。特朗普政府把中国推在前面,欲借中国手中的对朝制裁施压杠杆将朝逼到墙角,甚至为此展现了将朝核问题与中美经贸关系问题挂钩的倾向。然而中朝关系有其特殊性,中方不可能以牺牲中朝关系甚至改变朝政权为代价来满足美方的要求,特朗普对所谓“来自中国的帮助”的耐心正加速消耗。6月中旬被朝鲜扣押17个月的美国大学生奥托·瓦姆比尔在获释返美后不久即告死亡的事件在美国国内激起公愤,进一步压缩了特朗普政府改善对朝关系和与朝重启对话的空间。如果特朗普处理朝核问题失败,会不会迁怒中方,影响两国整体合作,这是中美关系的一大不确定性。


其次,中美经贸摩擦根源未消。特朗普政府的施政目标之一是对外寻求“公平贸易”,减少美国对外贸易逆差,而据美方统计,中国对美国贸易顺差占美外贸赤字总额的47%。“百日贸易谈判”虽取得初步成果,但主要还是在美国牛肉、农产品输华等相对容易的领域,尚未触及美国企业在华准入前国民待遇、中企赴美投资遭遇政治歧视、中国自美进口高技术产品受限等“结构性障碍”,越往后越艰难,中美双边投资协定谈判的重启也仍遥遥无期。一旦特朗普认为对中方的贸易谈判预期落空,有可能重挑汇率问题,两国在经济结构调整过程中的摩擦加剧。如特朗普税收制度改革落地,对中美经济关系的影响也需慎重评估。


第三,南海、台湾问题隐患长在。特朗普政府对南海问题关注不高,但美国军方忧惧尤切,坚持在南海继续实施“航行自由宣示行动”,以对中国的所谓“海上扩张战略”保持牵制并为自己强化在西太平洋地区的前沿海军部制造依据。南海海上摩擦甚至冲突的风险始终存在,亦不能排除美方在其它事情上与中方协调不顺借重挑南海问题发泄情绪的可能。本次中美外交安全对话后,美国国务卿蒂勒森向记者谈及南海问题说:“美国的立场没有变”,“我们反对以南海军事化的方式改变现状,反对国际法并不支持的过度海洋权利声索”。中方则强调,美方应恪守在有关主权争议问题上不持立场的承诺,尊重中国的主权和安全利益,尊重地区国家通过和平谈判解决有关争议的努力。


在台湾问题上,随着两岸“外交休兵”的结束和蔡英文当局摆出“哀兵姿态”,美方出于“两岸平衡”需要仍有可能出台新的对台军售计划。(本文定稿后,6月29日,特朗普政府通知国会,决定售台总额约14.2亿美元的武器装备,包括为早期预警雷达提供技术支持、反辐射导弹、鱼雷以及SM-2导弹零部件等。这批武器装备总额虽然并不算大,开启了特朗普政府对台军售进程。)


第四,美国政治内斗波及中美关系。特朗普就职快半年,仍未与华盛顿传统主流政治接轨,建制派与反建制派的斗争日趋尖锐,通过“通俄门”等形式表现出来,对特朗普施政构成严重牵制。在此背景下,特朗普政府不得不在亚太方向上求稳,对中国的倚重心态更加突出,但又急需在外交上取得一些实绩,特别是在经贸和朝核问题上,以向国内民众展示他可以有效为美国创造就业机会、具备解决外交疑难问题的能力,与中国打交道的急功近利心态突出,口口声声对华开展“结果驱动型”外交。这就在中美关系当中形成“悖论”,而特朗普对华政策缺乏清晰的战略思维也是未来中美关系最大的不确定性之一。


中美关系总体向好,稳定发展的态势渐成,但并没有摆脱传统和新型问题的纠缠,双方处理这一关系仍需高度慎重,最重要的是超越分歧,把控不确定性,追求共同利益的最大化,建立相互尊重的原则保障与互利合作的成果驱动的“双结合”范式。

 

中东酝酿新风暴

 

6月5日,沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋、巴林、埃及四国宣布与卡塔尔断交,切断与卡塔尔的海陆空交通,同时要求卡外交官在48小时内离境,要求卡塔尔籍公民在两周内离境。随后内,利比亚哈夫塔尔政权、也门、马尔代夫、毛里塔尼亚、科摩罗也宣布与卡塔尔断交。


事情直接起因是5月24日卡塔尔官方通讯社发布该国埃米尔塔米姆的某次演讲内容,称赞伊朗是“地区强国”和“地区稳定力量”,认为“对抗伊朗是不明智的”。尽管卡国官方事后澄清演讲稿为“托伪”之作,沙特、阿联酋官方媒体仍严厉指责卡塔尔支持伊朗、哈马斯、真主党、以色列。


卡塔尔是中东小国,与伊朗关系友好,共享近海气田,同时是美国的地区军事盟友,境内设有美军在海外规模最大的空军基地;长期支持、资助沙特等君主国敌视的穆斯林兄弟会,但又帮助沙特在也门打击伊朗支持的胡塞武装;与以色列保持着半正式的外交关系,但同时收留了哈马斯领袖马沙勒。卡塔尔同时又是中东富国,拥有巨额财富积累和灵活的海外交通、贸易网络,因此断交事件尚不致对卡国的正常运行造成太大影响。


断交事件中,土耳其和伊朗明确支持卡塔尔,美国却始终释放矛盾信号。事件爆发后不久,特朗普发推特表示“很高兴看到我访问沙特得到了回报”,国务院却说美国并未干预沙特等国的断交决定,国务卿蒂勒森呼吁沙特等放松对卡塔尔的封锁。6月14日,美防长马蒂斯与卡塔尔国防大臣签署军售大单,拟向卡出售数十架F-15战机,合同总额120亿美元,美两艘军舰同时抵卡与卡海军联合军演。


“断交危机”实为中东逊尼派国家对卡塔尔这个对什叶派国家奉行“开明政策”的逊尼派“骑墙者”的“逼宫”,有美国在背后怂恿甚至操作的影子,至少在动机解释上讲得通,与特朗普在中东划线孤立伊朗的政策暗相配合。事件将加剧中东的阵营壁垒。如果卡塔尔作出妥协,必须在伊朗、穆兄会问题上作出调整,减少对穆兄会的资助,停止对塔利班、哈马斯等组织的扶持,改组甚至关停半岛电视台,海湾国家已提了相关复交条件,科威特正积极斡旋。但目前卡塔尔似乎并没有低头的意思,即便低头也有可能“明修栈道暗度陈仓”,无法一刀剪断其与伊朗的千丝万缕联系。


6月21日,沙特国王萨勒曼宣布废除其侄子纳伊夫的王储之位,任命自己的儿子、副王储小萨勒曼为王储并继续担任国防大臣。此举被视为沙特内外政策进一步调整的风向标。


小萨勒曼今年31岁,自2015年担任副王储兼国防大臣以来,在诸多领域引人注目:军事上主导了对也门胡塞武装的打击;经济上启动了“2030愿景”经济社会改革计划,积极推动原本保守的国家在文化娱乐和吸引外资方面更加开放;主张关闭与伊朗的对话大门,推动了对卡塔尔的“断交”行动。“2030愿景”改革计划本身就由小萨勒曼负责,旨在让沙特摆脱油气经济单一化,巩固沙特地区头号大国地位。


小萨勒曼成为王储后不到一天,美国总统特朗普给他打电话表示祝贺。小萨勒曼与特朗普女婿库什纳关系密切,今年3月在其安排下访问白宫与特朗普会面,双方言谈甚欢为特朗普5月到访沙特做出铺垫。小萨勒曼访美期间,美沙签下价值1100亿美元的军购大单。美媒称,特朗普将小萨勒曼视为其巩固波斯湾地区逊尼派联盟关系的重要伙伴。

英国的“黑色六月”

英国度过了一个“黑色的六月”。先是6月3日伦敦多地相继再次遭受恐怖袭击造成多人伤亡,再是6月9日特雷莎·梅首相解散议会提前举行的大选产生意外结果,接着6月14日发生了震惊世界的伦敦高层公寓大火,导致数十人丧生或失踪。似乎流年不利,一股不安的政治氛围和紧张的社会情绪萦绕在唐宁街上空。6月19日,伦敦又发生厢式货车冲撞清真寺祷告民众的恶性事件,导致1死多伤,此事被警方作为“恐怖袭击”处理。


今年3月,伦敦威斯敏斯特大桥和议会大厦外曾经发生过导致3死40多伤的汽车冲撞“独狼”式恐怖袭击事件。这次伦敦桥附近的恐袭如出一辙,“伊斯兰国”恐怖组织更已宣布负责。接二连三的事件是恐怖极端势力对英国在叙利亚和中东问题上的政策的报复,加剧了英国社会的动荡不安之感。


在提前举行的英国大选中,尽管特蕾莎 梅保住了首相位子,但是其所在的保守党仅获318个议席,未超半数,失去了对议会的绝对主导权。在没有绝对多数党派领导下议院的情况下,英国再次出现由少数派政党领导的“悬浮议会”,此种议会模式将延长提案讨论审批时间,各项政策往往受到拖累无法落实。


两个月前特雷莎·梅解散议会时,意得志满地期待通过提前举行大选一举全面控制议会,从而以强势姿态与欧洲谈判“脱欧”。结果,保守议席不升反降,丢掉多数,这对特雷莎·梅是一场政治挫败。虽然特雷莎·梅选择继续执政并且强调将按预定时间表与欧盟开启谈判,但即使其与北爱尔兰民主统一党(本次大选中获得10个议席)合作组建新政府的努力得以实现,也只能是议会松散联盟。这次大选结果将使英国“脱欧”前景变得更加扑朔迷离。没有任何一个政党掌握议会控制权,在议会中力量更加壮大的反对党势必在“脱欧”谈判的每一个节点上给政府制造麻烦,英国的“脱欧”政策难以在国内形成共识,未来与欧盟的谈判变得更加艰难。


伦敦公寓大火的惨烈事件进一步触痛了英国社会,官方已启动全面调查,公众和媒体对特雷莎·梅政府和伦敦市政当局的迟钝反应十分不满,问责情绪高涨。


连串打击之下,特雷莎·梅的执政地位似已开始动摇,英国政坛正在酝酿新一轮洗牌。与此同时,政治不确定性的加剧将固化通胀上升和家庭收入增长疲弱的已成趋势,进一步拖累英国经济复苏。更深层次讲,一系列意外事件折射了英国精英主义与民粹主义摩擦的加剧,而这种动荡又与欧洲的整体不安和美欧摩擦的增长有着若即若离的关系。


 

Pangoal Institution

International Situation Monthly

June 2017 (Vol. 5) 

 

Donald Trump’s Middle East Diplomacy

Cracks in Transatlantic Relations

Stirs Caused by the US’s Exit from Paris Agreement

China-US Relations before the Second Xi-Trump Meeting

New Storm Ferments in Middle East

 “Black June” in the UK

 

Trump's Hasty Policies towards the Middle East

Saudi Arabia, the US’s principal ally in the Middle East, became the first destination for President Donald Trump’s first trip abroad as president. In the entirety of US history, a new president has never chosen a region other than Europe or the Americas as the first stop of his foreign tour—the maverick leader, again, set a precedent. During the trip, which had been in the works for more than three months, Trump also visited Israel and Palestine.

It is no secret that the Trump administration attaches great importance to Middle Eastern affairs when dealing with diplomacy. After Trump took office, he has hosted state leaders or royal family members of various Middle Eastern and Northern African countries in the White House, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Palestine, and Egypt, and kept in close contact via telephone with them. Through these contacts, Trump is not only quickly “learning” about the Middle Eastern affairs, but also attempting to develop the new administration’s policies towards the Middle East.

Originally, Trump intended to push for the US’s withdrawal from the Middle Eastern situation, decrease the extravagant cost of foreign strategic resources, and focus on anti-terrorism and Israeli-Palestinian talks. However, many of his advisors for security, diplomatic, and military affairs are senior officials with plenty of experience in the Middle East, and they believe that the Obama administration’s policies regarding the region were overly idealistic and tended to alienate Israel, thus leaving Russia substantial opportunities. Hence, they are determined to change US policy in the Middle East. As a result, the Trump administration continues the Republicans’ tradition of valuing Jewish interests, yet also appears cautious when handling the complexities in the region.

The Trump administration’s Middle East policies, which are already taking shape, contain five aspects. Firstly, they hold that the US should not continue involving in regime change and political reconstruction in the region, which is a tough and thankless job, and must concentrate instead on eliminating extremist forces like ISIS—this mission matches the doctrine of “America First,” which is reiterated in Trump’s domestic and foreign policies. Secondly, the US will drop the insistence that peace talks must be promoted with the two-state proposal, curb their ambiguous attitude toward the extension of Jewish settlements, shelve the claim about moving the US Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, and set about discussing how to continue the Middle East peace process with Middle Eastern allies. Thirdly, the US will maintain a tough stance on Iran, and impose additional unilateral sanctions for its missile tests; nevertheless, they will renege on the Iran nuclear deal, which Trump’s campaign team was keen to emphasize during the election, and may play a waiting game instead. Fourthly, the US will rearrange its cooperative relations on military and security issues with Middle Eastern allies, such as Saudi Arabia, in exchange for their financial support for the Trump administration’s domestic infrastructure development projects, among other economic schemes. Fifthly, the US will tighten immigration and visa policies towards certain countries in the Islamic world, in order to undermine threats to homeland security and protect jobs.

In April, with approval from Trump, the US Navy launched surgical strikes against an air base belonging to Syrian government forces, in a response to use of chemical weapons on rebels and civilians. The action was later suspended abruptly, so as to avoid getting stuck in Syria. This decision won Trump great credit inside the US, while at the same time halted the US’s plan to cease efforts to overthrow the Assad regime in its policies regarding Syria, and thus destroyed an opportunity for the US to improve bilateral relations with Russia using Middle Eastern affairs.

The logic implied within Trump’s first visit to the Middle East in late May 2017 matches these features. In Saudi Arabia, Trump addressed the first Arab-Islamic-American Summit, which also involved leaders from six Gulf Cooperation Council member states and approximately fifty Arabic and Islamic countries. In his long speech, he emphasized that Middle Eastern countries must band together to gain strength, instead of waiting around for the US to crush enemies for them. Meanwhile, he also identified three objectives of the joint efforts between the US and Middle Eastern countries to fight against terrorism: firstly, every country in the region has an absolute duty to ensure that terrorists find no sanctuary on their soil; secondly, the funding for terrorists must be cut off; thirdly, countries must also shut down oil sales channels and financial network for ISIS. Trump also sharply rebuked Iran, saying that it “has fueled the fires of sectarian conflict and terror,” and “funds, arms, and trains terrorists, militias, and other extremist groups that spread destruction and chaos across the region.” To conclude, he vowed that, “until the Iranian regime is willing to be a partner for peace, all nations of conscience must work together to isolate Iran.”

During his trip to Saudi Arabia, Trump revealed two “practical anti-terrorism actions”: the US sealed an arms deal with Saudi Arabia, which is worth 300 billion USD over 10 years, and over 100 billion USD will take effect immediately; the Global Center for Combating Extremist Ideology and Terrorist Financing Targeting Center was established in Saudi Arabia.

In Israel, Trump continued to stress that the special alliance between the US and Israel was “unbreakable,” and identified three targets in the US policies involving Israel during his presidency: jointly fighting against ISIS, jointly stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear capability, and facilitating the peace treaty between Israel and Palestine. During the “flash” visit to Israel, Trump said nothing about his claim to move the US Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, which was reiterated often during the election campaign.

During a half-day visit to Bethlehem, a city on the west bank of the Jordan River, Trump reaffirmed his commitment to help Palestine and Israel reach “a historic peace deal” when meeting with

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. However - probably to appease Israel - Trump talked vaguely about how to achieve peace before the press; in this case, Abbas reiterated that the peace agreement must be built upon the two-state proposal and urged Israel to recognize Palestine as a state.

Trump’s first trip to the Middle East shows that the new administration gives much weight to affairs in this region, but policy clues revealed during the past several months still cannot create a clearer picture. Thus far, Trump’s policies towards the Middle East are still pieces oriented around individual issues, and are unable to form an overall landscape. Hence, they may not deliver success.

Trump’s Middle East diplomacy has identified that ISIS is the top enemy and biggest security threat for the US in the region and attempts to separate most Muslims from a handful of extremist forces. Military operations targeting ISIS have achieved some results; however, if the US fails to take effective measures to eliminate the conditions that harbor terrorism, both the country and its allies will continue to be troubled by security threats.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration also makes it clear that Iran is the major Middle Eastern challenger to the geopolitical interests of the US, in an attempt to resume the Bush administration’s explicit policy of supporting Sunnis and suppressing Shias, and back up the fight of US allies (e.g. Saudi Arabia) against Iran. Nonetheless, Iran, as a major power in the region, boasts some brilliant schemes: it extends its strategic reach to both the east and the west, so as to vigorously expand its maneuvering, and thus it is not on the defensive when dealing with the US.

Trump’s policies towards the Middle East are strongly pragmatic, equipped with three goals: boosting the interests of the US arms merchants in the Middle East, receiving protection fees from governments of US allies, and enticing them to heavily invest in the US. They result in a completely unbalanced “bill,” which can hardly woo the US allies, let alone construct “another North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)” in this region.

Mounting facts coming to light indicate that when the domestic political needs contradict with the regional strategic schemes, Trump would choose the former—the air strike on Syria is proof of this. Trump’s Middle East peace plan has not taken shape yet, but it’s already on the horizon. He began this work earlier that any of his predecessors, and broke with the “tradition” that US presidents would not be fully dedicated to promote the peace talks between Israel and Palestine until the end of their term. He may be learning from his predecessors’ lesson that they began work on it so late that nothing was achieved. By planning for the landscape in advance, he is attempting to increase his odds to “leave a glorious name in the history.” With his Middle East diplomacy, Trump has determined the goal of achieving substantial progress in the promotion of Israeli-Palestinian talks during his presidency. However, he has to face both Benjamin Netanyahu’s government in Israel, the most conservative one in its history, and the Abbas regime of Palestine, which is comparatively less powerful. As a result, it is impossible for the Trump administration to cover the trust deficit between the two sides, while at the same time remaining skewed towards Israel.

 

Fundamental Cracks in Transatlantic Relations

On May 28th, the German chancellor Angela Merkel addressed an election rally in Munich: “The times in which we could completely depend on others are, to a certain extent, over.” She made these comments on US-Europe relations when referring to the G7 talks in Italy a few days ago, stating that “we Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands...we must fight for our future on our own, for our destiny as Europeans.” As the rally was organized in a beer tent, her speech is thus called the Bierzeltrede (beer tent speech). These statements clearly declare that Trump’s concluded European trip has achieved little in facilitating the US-Europe relations in the new era.

During the second half of Trump’s first foreign trip in late May, he made appearances in European countries, first visiting Italy and the Vatican, and then attending the NATO summit in Brussels, Belgium and G7 talks in Sicily, Italy. Wherever he went, the new president was greeted with the utmost courtesy and enjoyed sufficient media reach. However, since the US administration and European countries disagree sharply on various issues, Trump’s European trip was quite “awkward.”

When meeting with Pope Francis, Trump and his family beamed with smiles, while the Pope showed a grim expression; at the NATO summit, Trump jostled Montenegrin Prime Minister Dusko Markovic out of the way to secure a prominent spot for a photo opportunity; during a meeting at the US Embassy in Belgium, Trump had a tense handshake with France’s new president Emmanuel Macron—all this body language, which is described as “adaptive but aggressive” by the US media, have diverted attention from what he did during the trip.

For Trump, the major aim of his European trip was to fully demonstrate the “America First” doctrine when handling relations with European countries and emphasize the US’s leading role in Europe, instead of consolidating US-Europe partnerships and enhancing bilateral relations. In this way, he can justify himself in front of his domestic supporters and send a clear signal that he could be a “powerful president” both inside and outside the US, especially when his presidency is undermined by scandal over alleged contacts between Trump’s campaign team and Russia in addition to White House infighting.

While dining with Macron, Trump stressed that he had supported Macron’s election campaign; despite that, it is still known to all that he and French far-right leader Marine Le Pen once showed good feelings towards each other during the election. As the far right was stymied in the European elections held this year, the trend of conservatism in the US and Russia is slowing down, and the German Chancellor Merkel, “the last bastion of Western liberal power,” appears to be successful in seeking her fourth term. Therefore, Trump as the de facto leader of the US must act according to political trends, and conceal and adjust his support for the “right turn” of Europe together with the US.

During a meeting with the European Union (EU) and NATO leaders, Trump, on the one hand, scoffed that the new NATO headquarters is “beautiful,” while on the other hand criticized that European countries had not spent enough on national defense. Claiming that it was “not fair” for US taxpayers, Trump urged NATO states to reach the goal of spending 2 percent of their GDP on armament.

Perhaps as a way to further pressure European countries, Trump did not explicitly endorse the NATO mutual defense doctrine as usual when attending the summit, and brought a twisted piece of steel from the North Tower of the World Trade Center as a revealing “gift.” It was the 9/11 terrorist attacks sixteen years ago that triggered the application of Article 5 on Collective Defense of NATO, which means that each member state considers an armed attack against any member state, in Europe or North America, to be an armed attack against them all.

As the G7 summit members agreed to strengthen their efforts to fight against terrorism and continue imposing sanctions against Russia and pressuring North Korea, it is likely that the G7 leaders will continue to cooperate on security issues. However, as Trump refused to accept Europe’s stance on climate change, the two sides clashed with one another. The White House later announced that Trump would make a final decision regarding the US’s exit from Paris Agreement within one week of returning to the US.

Although the G7 summit agreed to resist protectionism and work together to improve the operation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the US and Europe still differ greatly on trade issues. When meeting with European Commission President Jean-Claude Junker and European Council President Donald Tusk, Trump’s private complaints about Germany being “bad, very bad” for selling so many cars to the US were recorded by the media, which led to new diplomatic spats between the two countries.

From the perspective of domestic politics, Trump’s European trip is “successful.” However, it was a “catastrophe” for US-Europe relations, as a German television network Das Erste commented when covering the G7 summit. Evidently, Europe is not a diplomatic priority for Trump, as his diplomatic schedule does not contain any long-term strategic plans concerning Europe—there are only short-term interests.

Europe is still a shield for the US’s battles against terrorism. The focus of US-Europe cooperation on security and defense will be further shifted to prevention and suppression of terrorism, and this will be connected with joint fights against terrorism launched by US and its Middle Eastern allies, which the Trump administration has been working on.

Trump believes that the US has committed too much to European defense, and thus he must urge European countries to share responsibilities. This has been fundamental for the Trump administration’s policies regarding European security, a barrier hindering the US and Europe from adapting their defense cooperation to changes in the international situation, and a major proof of the US’s increasing unreliability in the eyes of Europe.

For Trump, European countries, especially the industrial ones represented by Germany, are the US’s trade rivals and a major source of foreign trade deficit. Trump’s “Buy American, Hire American” campaign rhetoric must be first put into effect in US-Europe trade relations. In the years ahead, trade friction will remain a problem for bilateral relations.

After exiting from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Trump administration has not decided how to handle the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the negotiation of which is drawing to a close. Overall, they wish to continue discussion. Nevertheless, Europe has lost confidence in the Trump administration, refusing to resume negotiations. Hence, whether the US needs to make pragmatic adjustments depends on the overall trend of US-Europe economic relations.

Trump’s plan to improve US-Russia relations has ground to a halt due to scandal over alleged contacts between Trump’s campaign team and Russia. Hence, he cannot bypass the EU when handling relations with Russia and issues in Ukraine, Syria, and Iran. Therefore, the US must adopt more pragmatic polices and draw closer to Europe on relevant issues.

Trump is upset about the continuing domination of liberalism in Europe, and will further handle its relations with the UK and EU separately, so as to highlight the UK’s role in the US diplomatic policies towards Europe. In this way, US-UK relations will see substantial progress during his presidency, which will, in return, facilitate the UK’s exit from EU and continue impacting the inner momentum for changes in EU and the development of far-right populism.

For Europe, Trump stands for “a different America.” Will US commitments to European unity and security remain effective? Have the values connecting the US, Europe, and even the whole Western world together broken down? Europe must reconsider and renew the knowledge of these fundamental problems in the years ahead. It can be predicted that awareness of independent development will soar in Europe. While trying to maintain cooperative relations with the US, Europe will also seek to explore its own way of pragmatic diplomacy and focus more on all-round partnerships. In this sense, the opportunity for China-Europe relations may be a mid-to-long-term one.

 

Stirs Caused by the US's Exit from Paris Agreement

On June 1st, 2017, Trump announced that the US would cease all participation in the Paris Agreement, an addition to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Paris Agreement, painstakingly concluded at the United Nations Climate Change Conference on December 12th, 2015, and officially signed at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City on April 22nd, 2016, aims to provide an international law basis for the world’s response to climate changes in the post-2020 era. In this Agreement, each country commits and plans its own contribution to cutting down carbon emissions.

The efforts former US President Barack Obama made to mediate, facilitate, and conclude the Paris Agreement represent his core political and diplomatic legacy. The Obama administration, in adherence to liberalism, took responsibility for promoting and advancing the US’s energy reform. The Agreement is also an important symbol and result of China-US collaboration and cooperation in responding to global challenges. On September 3rd, 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Obama submitted their instruments of Agreement ratification to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon of United Nations (UN).

In running for his presidency, Trump trumpeted his platform that the Paris deal “bound” the US, which aroused deep concerns from the international community. After election, though not taking any immediate withdrawal measures, he called off the “Clean Power Plan” championed by the Obama administration, and made substantial cuts to the personnel and budget of the Environmental Protection Agency. The “Clean Power Plan” proposed to implement the obligations the US undertook within the framework of the Paris Agreement. According to the Plan, by 2030, the US would reduce national electricity sector emissions by an estimated 32 percent below 2005’s level.

Trump seems to be passive about climate change. This is, for one thing, an important manifestation of his political right-deviation and confrontation with liberalists and the pro-establishment camp, and for another, driven by profound economic benefits. In terms of domestic and foreign policies, Trump upholds the principle of “America First.” By taking measures such as attracting manufacturers back to the US, reducing foreign trade deficit, cutting development cost, and promoting energy consumption, the Trump administration aims to stimulate the economy to bounce back quickly within a short term, retain the support of the middle and lower class, and thus reinforce their ruling. Trump is backed by giant interest groups from the traditional energy sector who believe that the Clean Power Plan would increase economic growth cost, and suppress the recovery and backflow of middle- and lower-end manufacturing. Hence, they insist on annulling all international commitments.

Trump’s decision to leave the Paris Agreement, more than just affecting the global efforts on climate change, may influence international politics of the year 2017 in a lot of ways. This might be a start for the US’s “neo-isolationism” era in a real sense. That is to say, the US might further dismiss international obligations and begin favoring conservatism and selfishness, unless Trump steps down from his office, or some internal or external elements converge into a sufficiently strong impetus to force the Trump administration into remediation.

Anti-Trump sentiments have already been soaring in the US; now, his opponents are entirely riled. Not only the “political polarization” of the two dominant US parties has become more serious, but the “political vendetta” between the liberalists and the pro-establishment camp grows fiercer.

With the changes in the US’s “core values,” the issue of climate change is no longer a bond showing the mutual interests and values of the US and Europe, but a major area of diplomatic conflicts. The withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement has even touched the bottom line of bilateral relations, which will further alienate the two sides, shrink space for dialogues, and in the end, destroy mutual trust and shake the foundation of strategic interests. Nevertheless, the restoration of such a relationship would require generations of effort.

In regards to the issue of climate changes per se, the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement implies that the country, which emits as much as 17% of the world’s total carbon dioxide annually, has explicitly abandoned leadership in climate governance, and decided to scale down international climate-related aid. Though some states and cities as well as new economic businesses oppose this decision, and wish to remain in the Paris Agreement, the US, as a whole, can no longer fulfill its emission reduction commitments completely, only part of its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) at the most. The authority and effectiveness of the Paris Agreement would be greatly damaged, forcing all parties to reconsider their attitudes towards the commitments. The behaviors of the US would eventually make it harder and more expensive to achieve the target of keeping the global temperature rise well below 2°C.

China also faces smaller emission targets, greater emission reduction pressure, and increased reduction cost. Meanwhile, China-US climate cooperation, an important pillar for the development of bilateral relations, would be less effective. Nevertheless, this might give China greater advantage in leading renewable energy development as opposed to the US. There are two key questions worth thinking over: First, what should China do with this Agreement once the US leaves the Agreement? Continue to work as a “responsible power”? Or hold things back to a certain extent? As to this question, the world is watching China, waiting to follow. Secondly, as the US starts to “withdraw” from “leadership” in various fields of the international system, should China step forward and take the job? Is it time for China to do so? Is China strong enough?

The two key issues mentioned above call for all-around analysis and evaluation. But one thing is affirmative: China should not change its plan of promoting ecological progress and following a green development path. This is a goal specifically proposed at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, and an important part of the 13th Five-Year Plan for national economic and social development as well. The plan concerning ecological progress and green development is of vital importance to the nation’s economy and people’s livelihood, as well as the sustainable competitiveness of our nation and people, and thus can never be changed; nor should we retreat or regret.

 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization Expands

On June 9th, the 17th meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was held in Astana, capital of Kazakhstan. India and Pakistan were officially admitted as members of the SCO. After accepting the two countries, the SCO, now with eight members, has expanded its geographical coverage to South Asia, and become a regional organization featuring broad coverage, enormous population, and great potential. Notably, this is expected to create more cooperation opportunities, and enhance multilateral cooperation. For China, a new platform for improving relations with the two countries is now in place.

However, entrenched strategic doubts and security conflicts between India and Pakistan also raise concerns among the founding members of SCO. Would they bring contradictions and disputes into SCO, and add to the complexities of organizational operation and mechanism-based decision making? This concern does not come out of thin air. On the sub-regional cooperation platform of South Asia where India and Pakistan both belong to, the two countries are still as incompatible as fire and water. How can they set aside conflicts and make concerted efforts for multilateral cooperation?

Originally founded for security cooperation, the SCO has reached substantial achievements in regional anti-terrorism work, and developed a set of effective cooperation model beneficial to all parties. Terrorism and threats to national security develop contiguously in Central and South Asia, and the area links with equivalents in the Middle East to form a corridor under the influence of extremists. Both India and Pakistan are deeply afflicted by terrorism and religious extremist forces. The risks and challenges posed thereby have a direct bearing on the future of the two nations. With the substantive participation of India and Pakistan, and their acceptance of and compliance with SCO’s anti-terrorism principles, the organization’s anti-terrorism work is expected to become more powerful fundamentally, and the two new members will benefit greatly.

Cooperation of all parties is rapidly expanding to the economy, trade, and culture, etc., which generates an increasingly great attraction for India and Pakistan. Through SCO collaboration, it is possible that the two countries find a new path to steer clear of their disagreements, break through the limitation of thinking regionally, and thus jointly work for a win-win situation and reconsider their bilateral relations. In this way, the parties who have toiled to straighten out the strained relations among South Asian countries are expected to see light after spending so much time in the dark.

The SCO must make plans patiently and handle matters meticulously before its members come together. All parties should consider things from a broader perspective clearly and specifically. As to China, which maintains important relations with both India and Pakistan, the mediation of India-Pakistan relations under the framework of SCO serves as a key proving ground for it to mediate more issues on a broader scale.

 

China-US Diplomatic and Security Dialogue Held

On June 21st, 2017, as a vital initiative for implementing the outcomes from the Xi-Trump meeting in Mar-a-Lago in April 2017, the first round of China-US Diplomatic and Security Dialogues (D&SD) was held in Washington, D.C. This round of D&SD was co-hosted by Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis. General Fang Fenghui, member of Central Military Commission and Chief of the People’s Liberation Army’s Joint Staff Department, was also present.

Through the D&SD, the consensus reached by the two leaders was reinforced. Both sides pledged to expand areas of cooperation, manage differences on the basis of mutual respect, and promote healthy and stable development of bilateral relations in the long term.

According to the consensus list announced by China, the two sides have discussed the basic principles for improving bilateral interaction, and explored new ways of building strategic security trust. In the military-to-military relationship, both sides vowed to follow through on annual exchange programs and called for early mutual visits of the two countries’ defense chiefs and the visit of Joseph Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to China. The two sides also pledged to deepen cooperation on areas such as humanitarian assistance, anti-piracy, and military medical sciences and to implement memorandums of understanding on confidence-building mechanisms.

On June 22nd, President Trump met with Yang Jiechi and the Chinese delegation in the White House. Trump expressed delight to see China-US cooperation has made progress in all aspects since the Florida meeting, and expected more progress to be made in bilateral relations as high-level communication increases. In addition, he also stated that the US is ready to work together with China in projects concerning the Belt and Road Initiative.

The D&SD is one of the high-level dialogue mechanisms initiated by the two leaders after active interaction and readjustment of strategic dialogues. This year, the two countries will hold the first round of the other three high-level dialogues, with themes on economy, law enforcement and cybersecurity, and social and cultural issues respectively.

This round of D&SD also laid the foundation for closer and more direct interaction between Xi and Trump. According to the agenda, the two heads of state will meet again during the G20 summit next month in Hamburg, Germany, and Trump will visit China later this year upon Xi’s invitation.

The Florida meeting held in April put an end to an extended chill in China-US relations during the transitional phase of the US’s presidential terms. The formerly worsening of bilateral relations can be attributed to Trump’s unorthodox telephone call with Tsai Ing-wen, his subsequent suspicion of the One China policy, and remarks criticizing China on economic, trade, and North Korean nuclear issues. During the meeting, the two sides achieved principled consensus on promoting the building of a partnership that features non-confrontation, non-conflict, and mutual benefits. Additionally, the high-level dialogue mechanisms of China and the US were re-arranged; the 100-Day Action Plan on trade was initiated; and consensus on strengthening consultation over the North Korean nuclear issue and other regional security issues was reached. With these results, citizens seem to have become much more optimistic on China-US relations.

After the Xi-Trump meeting, the two sides have worked proactively for consensus implementation. The 100-Day Action Plan has already reaped “initial results”; meanwhile, the communication over the North Korean nuclear issue has, at least, prevented new nuclear tests and long-range missile launches. Notably, when the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation was held in Beijing this May, the Trump administration sent middle-ranked officials of the National Security Council (NSC) of the White House, which demonstrated an adjustment of the Capitol’s mistrustful and precautionary attitude toward China when it comes to international order changes.

With the China-US relations bouncing back, local governments and enterprises in the two countries spot potential opportunities once China and the US push for common interests with their reform and development strategies. Market intention for mutual investment comes back. In June, the 2017 SelectUSA Investment Summit was held in Washington, D.C. Among all countries present at the summit, China had the largest delegation made up of over one hundred and fifty investors from various industries. The US investors, engaged in innovation, agriculture, energy industry and financial service industries, renewed their hope in investing in China.

With the establishment of a model featuring mutual valuing and effective communication between the two countries, uncertainties in bilateral relations are considerably reduced, which creates relatively favorable conditions for the continuation of cooperation and management of differences. Nevertheless, risks remain. As China-US relations and international and regional situations are in constant development and undergo constant change, certain differences and frictions may still escalate.

First, there is still no solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. The Trump administration pushes China to bear the brunt, hoping to corner North Korea with Chinese sanctions, and even shows the tendency of linking the nuclear issue with China-US economic and trade relations. However, since there are some particularities in China-North Korea relations, it is impossible for China to satisfy the US’s demands at the cost of sacrificing bilateral relations or even changing North Korea’s regime. Trump is running out of patience regarding getting help from China. In mid-June, the US undergraduate Otto Warmbier died just days after returning to his homeland after he was imprisoned for 17 months in North Korea, which aroused public indignation. Because of this incident, the possibility for the Trump administration to improve relations with North Korea and restart bilateral dialogues has further decreased. Given that Trump has not handled the North Korean nuclear issue properly, it remains unclear whether the White House will blame China and urge bilateral cooperation.

Secondly, sources of China-US economic and trade friction are yet to be removed. Among all administrative objectives, Trump seeks to make international trade fair again, and reduce the foreign trade deficit. And US statistics show that China’s trade surplus with the US accounts for 47% of the US’s trade deficit. Though the 100-Day Action Plan has made initial achievements, most of them are confined to areas with relatively good conditions such as beef and agricultural products exported to China, while the “structural impediments” are yet to be removed. For example, few pre-establishment national treatments are granted to the US enterprises in China; Chinese enterprises are confronted with political discrimination when they invest in the US, and China is somewhat restricted from importing high-tech products from the US. Things may grow more difficult over time. And the resumption of the Negotiations on the China-United States Bilateral Investment Treaty is at a far distant date. If Trump believes the trade negotiations would amount to nothing, he might return to foreign exchanges, thus resulting in more severe frictions in economic restructuring. Once the White House’s reform of the taxation system starts, it is essential to cautiously assess the reform’s influence on China-US economic relations.

Thirdly, the potential risk of South China Sea issue and Taiwan issue looms. Though the Trump administration is not so concerned with the South China Sea issue, the US military forces are especially worried and apprehensive, and insist on implementing the “Freedom of Navigation Program,” in order to pin down China’s marine strategies and strengthen the basis for the development of its Department of the Navy in the Western Pacific Region. Besides the risks of frictions or even conflicts on the South China Sea, the US might find an excuse to bring up this issue in case of other contradictions. In an interview with the press after the D&SD, Tillerson noted that “the US position remains unchanged”: “We oppose changes to the status quo of the past through the militarization of outposts in the South China Sea and excessive maritime claims unsupported by international law.” Meanwhile, China stressed that the US side should abide by its commitment to impartiality on relevant disputes concerning territorial sovereignty, respect China’s sovereignty and security interests, and respect the efforts of regional countries to resolve disputes through peaceful negotiation.

When it comes to the Taiwan issue, as the “diplomatic truce” crumbles and Tsai Ing-wen loses control of the diplomatic situation,the US, in consideration of the requirements for geopolitical balance, is expected to announce new arms sales to Taiwan. (Days after this essay was finalized, on June 29, the Trump administration noticed the Capitol Hill that it had approved weapons sales to Taiwan. Valued at around 1.42 billion dollars, the deal includes technical support for early warning radar, anti-radiation missiles, torpedoes and components for SM-2 missiles valued at around 1.42 billion dollars. Though the total amount of the weapons is not very large, this deal signifies a start of the Trump administration’s arm sales to Taiwan.)

Fourthly, China-US relations suffer from political infighting in the US. Nearly half a year after Trump took office, he still has not integrated into Washington’s traditional mainstream politics. The increasingly acute fight between pro-establishment and anti-establishment camps, as seen in the Trump-Russia scandal and others, seriously hinders the government from working efficiently. With this background, the Trump administration has sought balance in the Asia-Pacific Region, hence the greater reliance on China. Nevertheless, the White House is badly in need of diplomatic achievements, especially in economy, trade, and the North Korean nuclear issue. Only in this way can Trump prove his ability to create jobs and solve diplomatic problems for the country. Therefore, he is anxious to achieve quick success and receive instant benefits in dealing with China. However, the “results-driven” diplomacy he touts is paradoxical; in addition, since the US now lacks clear strategic thinking on policies toward China, there are still many uncertainties in the development of China-US relations.

In general, China-US relations are changing for the better and developing stably. However, traditional and new problems remain to be solved. In solving the problems, the two sides should use a highly cautious manner, and most important of all, set aside differences, manage uncertainties, seek maximization of common interests, and put in place a “dual-combination” paradigm guaranteed by the principle of mutual respect and driven by the results of mutually beneficial cooperation.

 

New Storm Ferments in Middle East

Two exceptional events occurred in June 2017: the Qatar-centered “Tie-breaking Storm” and Saudi Arabia’s crown prince replacement.

On June 5th, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt ended diplomatic relations with Qatar, cutting off land, air, and sea travel to and from Qatar, and demanding that Qatari diplomats leave the country within 48 hours and citizens two weeks. Soon, the Haftar regime of Syria, Yemen, Maldives, Mauritania, and Comoros also broke ties with Qatar.

The event was directly caused by Qatar Newswire, the country’s official news agency. It published a speech by the Emir Tamim on May 24th, appreciating Iran as a “regional power” and “force for regional stability,” and considering it “unwise” to stand against Iran. Though the Qatari authorities later clarified that the speech was fake, the official media in Saudi Arabia and UAE still criticized Qatar for supporting Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Israel.

As a small country in the Middle East, Qatar has sound relations with Iran and shares off-shore gas fields with it. Meanwhile, it is also a military ally of the US in the region, and operates the US’s largest overseas air base. While providing sustained support and funding to the Muslim Brotherhood, a hostile group in the eyes of monarchical states, it also helps Saudi Arabia strike Iran-supported Houthi rebels in Yemen. It maintains semi-formal diplomatic ties with Israel, but also hosts the Hamas leader Mashal. Moreover, as a rich country with convenient overseas transportation and trade network, Qatar is not much affected by the tie-breaking events.

In the course of events, Turkey and Iran clearly supported Qatar, whereas the US sent contradictory signals. Soon after the event broke out, Trump tweeted that it was “so good to see the Saudi

Arabia visit already paying off.” On the contrary, the State Department said that the US did not interfere with the tie-breaking decisions, and the Secretary of State Tillerson called on Saudi Arabia and other states to relax the blockade against Qatar. On June 14th, the US Defense Secretary Mattis signed a huge arm sales order with his Qatari counterpart, planning to sell dozens of F-15 fighters to Qatar, with a total value of twelve billion USD. In the meantime, two US warships arrived in Qatar for a joint military exercise with the Qatari navy.

The “Qatar diplomatic crisis” is actually a compelling event induced by Sunni states against Qatar, a Sunni “fence sitter” pursuing “enlightened policies.” At least in terms of its motivations, the US can be a hidden driver or even manipulator, serving Trump’s policies to isolate Iran from other Middle Eastern countries. The event will further divide the Middle East into blocks. If Qatar makes a concession, it must adjust policies on issues related to Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood, such as reducing funding to the Brotherhood, stopping support for Taliban and Hamas, and reorganizing and even closing down Al Jazeera. While Gulf States have put forward conditions for the reestablishment of diplomatic ties, and Kuwait is also actively mediating, Qatar seems not to have given in at the moment. Even if it does so, it may only pay some lip service whilesustaining links with Iran.

On June 21st, the Saudi King Salman removed his nephew as crown prince in favor of his son, defense minister and former deputy crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, which is seen as a sign of further adjustment in Saudi Arabia’s domestic and foreign policies.

The 31-year-old Salman has already attracted much attention in many fields since becoming the deputy crown prince and defense minister. Militarily, he led the strike against Houthi rebels in Yemen; economically, he launched the “Vision 2030” plan for economic and social reform, and actively promoted openness in culture, entertainment, and foreign investment in this conservative country; he also proposed ending dialogues with Iran and drove the tie-breaking event against Qatar. The “Vision 2030” reform plan, under the charge of young Salman, aims to free the country from sole reliance on oil and secure Saudi’s position as the top regional power.

No more than one day after young Salman became the crown prince, the US President Trump sent his congratulations on the phone. The young Salman has a close relationship with Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner. Kushner arranged young Salman’s meeting with Trump in the White House this March, which laid a foundation for Trump’s visit to Saudi this May. During his visit to the US, the two sides signed a bulk arm sales order totaling 110 billion USD. According to the US media, Trump sees young Salman as a key partner in consolidating the Sunni coalition in the Persian Gulf Region.

 

"Black June" in the UK

The UK has experienced a “Black June”: on June 3rd, several places in London suffered terrorist attacks, which caused large casualties; on June 9th, Prime Minister Theresa May held an early election after dissolution of the Parliament, which produced unexpected results; successively on June 14th, the world-shocking fire at Grenfell Tower broke out, with dozens of citizens dead or missing. With a disquieting political atmosphere and social tension lingering around Downing Street, London is having an unlucky year. On June 19th, another vicious incident occurred – a van truck dashed into worshippers at a mosque, causing one death and several injuries. The incident was handled by the police as a “terrorist attack.”

This March, a “lone wolf” terrorist attack occurred in London. A car crashed outside Parliament at the Westminster Bridge, resulting in three deaths and over forty injuries. There was nothing different from the one which happened near the London Bridge, and ISIS has already claimed responsibility. These successive incidents are revenges taken by extremist terrorist forces on UK policies in Syria and the Middle East, which aggravated the social turbulence in the country.

In the early election, though Theresa May held her position as the Prime Minister, the Conservatives she led obtained only 318 seats, and lost majority in Parliament. With no party winning enough seats to have a majority in the House of Commons, a “hung Parliament” led by a minority party emerged again, which would prolong discussions on proposals and delay policy implementation.

Two months ago, when Theresa May dissolved Parliament, she expected to exercise full control over Parliament by means of an early election, and negotiate the Brexit with Europe in a strong position. However, it turned out that the Conservatives held even fewer seats and lost the majority position, which was a political setback for her. Theresa May chose to continue in office and stressed she would launch Brexit negotiations with the EU as scheduled. However, even if her efforts to form a new government with the Democratic Unionist Party (ten seats in the election) were successful, there would only be a loose coalition. The election results would render the prospect of Brexit even harder to predict. With no single political party having control over the Parliament, the more powerful opposition parties are bound to make trouble for the government during Brexit negotiations. In absence of a domestic consensus on Brexit policies, future negotiations with the EU might become more difficult.

The tragic fire at the Grenfell Tower further harmed UK society. The authorities have initiated a complete investigation. As the public and media are highly dissatisfied with the May government and the London municipality for their delayed response, there have been great demands for accountability.

Under a series of strikes, Theresa May’s ruling position seems to have wavered, and a new round of political reshuffling is under way. Furthermore, increasing political uncertainties will solidify already serious inflation and sluggish family income growth, hindering economic recovery in the UK. At a deeper level, a series of incidents reflected the worsening of frictions between elitism and populism, which is loosely linked with the general unrest in Europe and frequent disputes between the US and Europe.

 

2017年6月国际形势大事记 

 

 

6月1日,美国总统特朗普宣布美国退出《巴黎协定》。

 

正在德国访问的李克强总理和默克尔总理共同宣布,中德两国将恪守在《巴黎协定》中做出的承诺。


6月3日,英国伦敦市中心的伦敦桥、伦敦桥附近的博罗市场和沃克斯豪尔地区接连发生三起恐怖袭击事件,造成7人死亡,48人受伤。

 

6月5日,巴林、沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋、埃及、也门、利比亚、马尔代夫、毛里求斯等国以卡塔尔支持恐怖主义活动为由,分别宣布与卡塔尔断绝外交关系。

 

6月7日至10日,中国国家主席习近平对哈萨克斯坦共和国进行国事访问并出席上海合作组织成员国元首理事会第十七次会议和阿斯塔纳专项世博会开幕式。

 

6月8日,被特朗普解职的前联邦调查局局长科米在美国国会参议院情报委员会作证。

 


6月9日,英国大选揭晓,特蕾莎•梅成功连任首相,但其所在的保守党仅获318个席位,未超半数,失去议会领导权。


印度、巴基斯坦在上海合作组织成员国元首理事会第十七次会议上被正式接纳为上合组织成员国。


外媒报道,两名在巴基斯坦俾路支省被绑架的中国公民被“伊斯兰国”恐怖组织杀害。

 

 

6月12日,巴拿马总统巴雷拉宣布巴拿马与中华人民共和国建交。

 

6月13日,朝鲜释放被其关押17个月的美国大学生奥托·瓦姆比尔。瓦姆比尔被送返美国后,被医生诊断为大脑严重受损,对外界刺激无反应。

 

6月14日,英国伦敦西部一栋名为“格伦费尔塔”的27层居民楼发生火灾,截至16日造成30人死亡、45人下落不明,特雷莎·梅首相下令对火灾情况进行全面的公共调查。

 

6月16日,德国前总理赫尔穆特·科尔去世。

 

美国总统特朗普宣布,收紧部分奥巴马政府的美国对古巴政策,禁止美国企业与古巴军方控制的企业有生意往来,同时收紧对美国公民前往古巴旅游的限制,还强调美国将继续执行对古巴的经济、金融封锁和贸易禁运。


6月17日,美军宙斯盾舰“菲茨杰拉德”号在日本静冈县伊豆半岛近海与菲律宾籍集装箱船相撞,事故造成美舰舰体严重受损,舰上7名乘员落水死亡。

 

6月18日至20日,2017“选择美国”峰会在华盛顿举行,中国代表团是所有与会国家中最大的,有来自不同产业的150多个投资方参团。

 

6月19日,伦敦发生厢式货车冲撞清真寺祷告民众的恶性事件,导致1死多伤,驾驶货车的48岁男子当场被民众制伏。

 

被朝鲜释放的美国大学生奥托·瓦姆比尔在返回家乡辛辛那提后死亡。特朗普总统发表声明,谴责朝鲜政权的“暴虐行为”。


6月21日,沙特国王兼首相萨勒曼21日发布命令,免去他的侄子纳伊夫的王储之位,任命自己儿子、副王储小萨勒曼为王储,并继续担任国防大臣。

 

首轮中美外交安全对话在美国华盛顿举行。

 

6月22日,法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙接受媒体采访时就叙利亚问题宣称,法国不再以叙总统巴沙尔·阿萨德为首要目标,而是专注于彻底铲除恐怖组织并达成叙和平稳定。为此,法国希望与俄罗斯合作。

 

6月23日,沙特阿拉伯等国向卡塔尔提出解决外交争端的多项条件,包括卡塔尔需降格与伊朗的外交关系,关闭半岛电视台等。

 


6月24日,朝鲜外务省就美国大学生奥托·瓦姆比尔死亡事做出回应,否认与之有关。

 

日本首相、自民党总裁安倍晋三在神户市发表演讲,称希望在即将到来的临时国会结束前,向众参两院的宪法审查会提交自民党修宪草案。


6月29日,美国国务院通知国会,批准向台湾出售总额14.2亿美元的武器装备。


 

International Events in April & May, 2017

 

● On June 1st, the US President Trump announced that the US would withdraw from the Paris Agreement.


During his visit to Germany, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that China and Germany would honor their commitment to the Paris Agreement.


● On June 3rd, three terrorist attacks took place at the London Bridge, the nearby Borough Market, and Vauxhall in central London, causing seven deaths and forty-eight injuries.


● On June 5th, countries including Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Libya, Maldives, and Mauritius cut off diplomatic ties with Qatar, accusing the country of supporting terrorist activities.


● From June 7th to 10th, Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Kazakhstan and attended the 17th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Member States and the Opening Ceremony of Expo 2017 Astana.


● On June 8th, James Comey, former FBI director dismissed by Trump, bore witness at the Senate Intelligence Committee.


● On June 9th, the UK election results were announced. While Theresa May was successfully re-elected as Prime Minister, the Conservative Party she led only secured 318 seats, less than half of the total seats, and lost its leading position in Parliament.


India and Pakistan were formally accepted as SCO member states at the 17th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO Member States.


Foreign media reported that two Chinese citizens kidnapped in Baluchistan, Pakistan were killed by ISIS.


● On June 12th, Panamanian President Varela announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.


● On June 13th, North Korea released the US college student Otto Warmbier after seventeen months of imprisonment. After being sent back to the US, Warmbier was diagnosed with severe brain damage and he was unresponsive to external stimuli.


● On June 14th, a residential building named “Grenfell Tower” in west London caught fire. By June 16th, thirty were dead and forty-five were unaccounted for. Prime Minister Theresa May ordered a thorough investigation into the fire.


● On June 16th, former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl passed away.


US President Trump announced that the US would tighten some of US policies on Cuba issued by the Obama administration, prohibit US enterprises from trading with those controlled by the Cuban military, and restrict limitations on US citizens travelling to Cuba. He also emphasized that the US would continue its economic and financial blockade and trade embargo against Cuba.


● On June 17th, the US Aegis ship Fitzgerald crashed into a Philippine container ship in waters near the Izu Peninsula of Shizuoka Prefecture, Japan. The accident caused serious damage to the US ship, with 7 crew drowned.


● From June 18th to 20th, the 2017 SelectUSA Investment Summit was held in Washington. China dispatched the largest delegation among all participating countries. Over 150 investors from different industries joined the delegation.


● On June 19th, a vicious incident occurred in London. A van plowed into a crowd of worshippers at a mosque, causing one death and several injuries. The 48-year-old man driving the van was arrested on site.


After release by North Korea, the US student Otto Warmbier died in a hospital in his hometown of Cincinnati. President Trump made a statement and denounced North Korea’s “brutality.”


● On June 21st, Saudi King and Prime Minister Salman issued an order to strip his nephew Nayef from his title as crown prince and appoint his son, deputy crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, as crown prince and defense minister.


The first round of US-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue was held in Washington D.C.


● On June 22nd, French President Emmanuel Macron remarked on the Syrian issue in an interview that France would abandon efforts to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad; instead, it would launch a complete fight against all terrorist groups for peace and stability in Syria. To this end, France expects cooperation with Russia.


● On June 23rd, countries including Saudi Arabia offered Qatar several terms to resolve diplomatic disputes, including requiring Qatar to downgrade its relations with Iran and close down Al Jazeera.


● On June 24th, the North Korean Foreign Ministry replied to the death of US student Otto Warmbier and said it was not involved.


The Japanese Prime Minister and Liberal Democratic Party President Shinzo Abe addressed in Kobe, hoping to present a proposal for constitutional amendments to the commissions on the constitution of both chambers of the Diet before the end of an upcoming extraordinary Diet session.


● On June 29th, the US State Department informed the Congress of approved weapons sales to Taiwan valued at 1.42 billion dollars.

 


盘古动态

- 盘古新闻

- 大事记

盘古观点

- 盘古专栏

- 媒体采访

盘古研究

- 研究报告

- 出版物

关于盘古

- 盘古简介

- 学术委员会

联系我们

- 联系我们

- 招贤纳才

关注我们

公众帐号

智库简介 招贤纳才 联系我们 官方app下载

技术支持:才高八斗@2013-2015 盘古智库官网 版权所有 京ICP备14001631