The Nuclear Situation on the Korean Peninsula and China’s Responses in 2017

An Gang[1]

In 2017, tension from Korean Peninsula nuclear issue constantly escalated. Firstly, North Korea’s will and action to acquire nuclear capability appears stronger than ever: it conducted its sixth nuclear test, acted recklessly with trials of ballistic missiles, and quickly developed nuclear weapons, thus undermining the international non-proliferation regime and prompting stricter sanctions from the international community. Secondly, the Trump administration in the US continued to harden sanctions against North Korea, repeatedly signaled threats of force with its allies such as South Korea and Japan, and refused to negotiate with North Korea, sending tensions on the Peninsula spiraling upwards. Overall, among the security issues in the Asian-Pacific region, the North Korean nuclear issue has the highest risk of spinning out of control. The country, again, stands at a crossroads between war and peace. Although there is not yet a solution to the issue, considering that the situation on the Peninsula may affect its own security, strategic interests, and the relations between major regional powers, China proactively mediated among various parties and attempted to bring them back to the negotiating table. Despite little progress thus far, China acts as a constructive and responsible major power. At present, three possible futures are beckoning: negation, war, and endless delays, the last of which is already in effect. In the long run, engaging in dialogue to safeguard security is the only way to break the vicious cycle regarding the security of Northeast Asia.

I. North Korea’s nuclear weapon capability accelerates to approach the critical point at which nuclear weapons are combined with missiles, ready to establish systematic, strategic deterrence against the US and its allies.

(I) North Korea’s Sixth Nuclear Test

At approximately 11:30 a.m. Beijing time (12:00 a.m. North Korean time) on September 3^rd, 2017, North Korea tested a hydrogen bomb at its northern nuclear test ground (Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site). This was the sixth nuclear test North Korea has conducted since 2006 and the largest in terms of explosive power (the nuclear yield was equivalent to about 200 kilotons of TNT), as well as the second hydrogen bomb (H-bomb) test as stated by North Korean authorities (the first one was conducted on January 6^th, 2016). The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that the test was carried out “to examine and confirm the accuracy and credibility of the power control technology and internal structural design newly introduced into manufacturing an H-bomb to be placed as the payload of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).” The test results once again confirmed the reliability of a concentration-type nuclear detonation control system, fully verified through a nuclear warhead detonation test and test-launches of various ballistic rockets. It concluded that “the test of the H-bomb for ICBM achieved a perfect success,” that “the design and production technology of nuclear weapons of the DPRK has been put on a high level to adjust its destructive power in consideration of the targets and purposes,” and that “it also marked a very significant occasion in attaining the final goal of completing the state nuclear force.”[2]

On the morning of September 3^rd, KCNA reported that North Korea’s paramount leader Kim Jong-un inspected the country’s Nuclear Weapons Institute. During the visit, Kim stated that all components of the H-bomb were 100 percent homemade, and that all the processes ranging from the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials to precision processing of components and their assembly were developed within North Korea, thus enabling the country to produce as many powerful nuclear weapons as it wants. Pictures of leader Kim Jong-un inspecting the new thermonuclear device accompanied the report, indicating that North Korea’s nuclear weapon program was not a strategic deception.

The earthquake magnitude measured this time was higher than those of the previous five tests. The China Earthquake Networks Center placed the magnitude of the first earthquake, which occurred at 11:30 a.m. on September 3^rd, at 6.3 and the location of its epicenter at 41.35 degrees north latitude and 129.11 degrees east longitude, with a depth of zero km. The global monitoring system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) initially placed the magnitude at 5.8-6.0, and later revised it to 6.1[3]. Website 38 North at Johns Hopkins University in the US estimated that the yield was equivalent to more than 100 kilotons of TNT, and later suggested the bomb’s yield could have been up to 250 kilotons.[4] The Institute of Geology and Geophysics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, observed the earth volume accumulated on the nuclear test ground with satellite pictures and estimated the digging depth to be 1-2.4 km, equivalent to an explosion of 100-200 kilotons of TNT[5]. Japanese Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera told the press that the estimated size of North Korea’s sixth nuclear test was a yield of around 160 kilotons, more than 10 times the size of the Hiroshima bomb.[6] Various parties suggested that this might be an H-bomb test, and the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission of South Korea said it found traces of radioactive xenon gas in the country after North Korea’s test. However, public sources showed that no one could provide sufficient evidence of an actual H-bomb test.

On September 13^th, President David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) stated in the hearing held by the US Senate Committee on Appropriations that the yield of North Korea’s sixth nuclear test was much higher than that of the previous five ones, suggesting that it was some type of thermonuclear device used to increase the yield of fission design. However, the US should be skeptical of North Korea’s claim that this test was a miniaturized two-stage thermonuclear device. Additionally, since the device in the picture distributed by North Korean press did not provide more detail than that which is readily available to the general public, it was likely more aimed at spreading propaganda. To produce powerful miniaturized two-stage thermonuclear weapons and design more efficient fission weapons and fission-boosted weapons that use less plutonium or weapon-grade uranium per kiloton of explosion, North Korea is likely to conduct more underground tests, explore more optimized one-stage thermonuclear weapons, and develop more tailored electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons.[7]

Russia believed that North Korea’s sixth nuclear test was not an H-bomb test, and elaborated on this viewpoint at the consultation held by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in response to the test.

(II) North Korea’s Intense Ballistic Missile Trials

North Korea conducted eight major ballistic missile trials in 2017, including six Hwasong-12 launches and two Hwasong-14 launches.

North Korea tested Hwasong-12, a new type of surface-to-surface intermediate-range ballistic missile, on April 15^th, April 16^th, April 29^th, May 14^th, August 28^th, and September 15^th, respectively. The missile was first revealed to the international community on April 14^th, 2017, in a military parade celebrating the Day of the Sun, the 105^th birthday of North Korea’s founding President, Kim Il-sung. Of the six launches, Kim Jong-un guided the latter three launches on the spot. In the first test, the missile traveled a range of 60 km with an apogee of 189 km, and landed in the Sea of Japan approximately nine minutes later. In the second test, the missile was reported to have exploded within several seconds after launch. The missile in the third test reportedly flew 30-odd km before exploding. Later on May 14^th, North Korea conducted its fourth trial, after which North Korean state media played up the success, claiming that the missile was fired on a lofted trajectory with an apogee of 2,111.5 km, landing 787 km away in the open ocean as expected. Nevertheless, North Korean media did not report on the trial on August 28^th. South Korea and the US believed that the Hwasoong-12 missile in this test flew a total of 2,700 km and failed to land in the North Pacific as expected. For the trial on September 15^th, the KCNA reported that the missile was fired on the intended trajectory, flew over Hokkaido, and then precisely landed on the targeted waters of the Pacific Ocean. “The test examined the order in how to deal with nuclear warheads, confirmed action procedures for actual war, and thus was of very great meaning in increasing combat power of the nuclear force.”[8]

North Korea tested a Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile on July 4^th and another on July 28^th. According to the KCNA reports, Kim Jong-un guided the launches on the spot and both trials were successful. South Korean press, citing monitoring information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as analysis and assessment of relevant experts, revealed that the missile launched on July 4^th reached an altitude of 2,300 km and a lateral distance of over 930 km; if fired on a standard trajectory, the missile might have a range of 6,000 km, meaning it could potentially reach the US soil similar to an intercontinental ballistic missile. According to the technical specifications of the July 28^th trial revealed by North Korean authorities, the missile reached as high as 3,724.9 km and flew 998 km for 47 minutes and 12 seconds before landing in targeted international waters. This showed that North Korea was capable of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles anywhere and anytime, and that “the entire US was within North Korea’s striking range.”[9]

Meanwhile, North Korea conducted several tests of medium-range missiles in 2017, including the launch of Pukguksong-2, a solid-fuel medium-range surface-to-surface ballistic missile, on February 12^th (the first missile launch of North Korea in 2017 and the first trial of Pukguksong-2), the launch of Hwasong-7 medium-range missiles on March 6^th (four missiles at once), and the launch of the operational-tactical Hwasong-9 missile (a road-mobile missile with a modifiable end) on May 29^th.

North Korea’s missile industry started in the mid-20^th century based on Soviet missiles and technologies. It mainly manufactures short-range, medium-range, intermediate-range, and sub-marine launched missiles. The years after Kim Jong-un took power have witnessed an intense spate of missiles tests. Incomplete statistics suggest that North Korea conducted five launches of various missiles in 2013, 11 in 2015, 15 in 2014 and another 15 in 2016. It’s a fact: North Korea is accelerating its pace of verifying and showing “the reliability of its intercontinental ballistic missile systems,” with a significant increase in the success rate of its tests, in an effort to acquire atmospheric reentry technologies as soon as possible, achieve effective combat power, and complete the transition from medium-range missiles to long-range ones.

 (III) A Basic Assessment of the Advancement of Nuclear and Missile Capabilities of North Korea

Since 2006, North Korea has conducted six underground nuclear tests and tested dozens of ballistic missiles of various types, for the obvious purpose of developing its capabilities to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles which can carry different miniaturized nuclear warheads, and to form strategic deterrence against the US and its allies.

Corresponding with its rapidly advancing nuclear and missile technologies, North Korean leadership continuously reiterates its political will to firmly facilitate its nuclear and missile programs and consolidate its nuclear strategy. Following its constitutional amendment in April 2012, writing “Comrade Kim Jong Il turns our country into an indefectible nation in political ideology, a state with nuclear capabilities and an unconquerable military power, and paves the way to constructing a strong and prosperous country,” the 7^th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) in May 2016 set the principle of “simultaneously building nuclear force and pushing forward economic construction,” and raised three major policies as a “nuclear power”: no-first-use of nuclear weapons, fulfillment of non-proliferation duties, and endeavoring to a denuclearized world. On October 7^th, 2017, Kim Jong-un stressed at the Second Plenary Meeting of the Seventh WPK Central Committee that under the current grim situation, the whole Party should unite as a whole to independently break sanctions and develop its economy with the power of scientific technologies, carry out the principle of simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear force, and to “accomplish the historic mission of enhancing national nuclear force in an outstanding manner.” It is worth noting that the meeting tried to move beyond the nuclear issue itself and “normalize” its nuclear force. In other words, without exaggerating the importance of nuclear strategy, it attempts to turn the capabilities demonstrated in its six nuclear tests and dozens of missile launches into a “normal” that the world needed to adapt to, showing that North Korea is undeniably a “nuclear power” and its nuclear force is nonnegotiable.[10]

On April 15^th, at the grand military parade in memory of the 105^th birthday anniversary of the late president Kim Il-sung (“Day of the Sun”), North Korea presented various types of missiles to the international community. Besides the “KN08” and “KN14” intercontinental missiles, there is also one similar to Russia’s Topol-M intercontinental missile in shape, which is longer than “KN08” and “KN14” and may be a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile developed by North Korea.

On September 11^th, North Korea’s National Day, Kim Jong-un addressed the celebration of the sixth nuclear test, stating that “the sound of the hydrogen bomb is a great victory won by the Korean people at the cost of their blood while tightening their belts in times of difficulty.” He also encouraged engineers and technical staff to make “redoubled efforts, not slackening the spirit displayed by them in bringing the great auspicious event of the national history.”

While there has almost been no doubt that North Korea is already capable of conducting nuclear strikes against South Korea, Japan, or even Guam with ballistic missiles, different views exist about whether North Korea is able to establish substantive nuclear threats to mainland US. It is generally believed that to truly achieve the goal claimed by Choi Sun-hee, the top North Korean diplomat who handles relations with the US, North Korea still must conquer two technical difficulties: one is atmospheric reentry technology and precision guidance and control for ballistic missiles, and the other is miniaturization of nuclear warheads and credibility of igniters. Only by overcoming these two difficulties and achieving stable technical performance can North Korea be considered to have finished the “nuclear and missile combination” necessary for securing effective strategic deterrence. Despite rapid progress in the two aspects above, there is still a long way for North Korea to go before real “nuclear and missile combination.” However, it is undeniable that its nuclear and missile program has entered the final stage, when all parties will have to face a more confident North Korea with capabilities to conduct nuclear strikes.

In February 2015, North Korea’s Nuclear Futures, a research report published by the US-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and US National Defense University, predicted that by 2020, North Korea will possess 50 to 100 nuclear warheads, and will be able to keep at least 50 to 60 of them[11]. In 2017, the US reevaluated North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. According to a report by Washington Post on July 25^th, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) under the US Department of Defense predicted in an internal report that North Korea has made striking progress in missile launch technologies, and will produce reliable intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) which can carry nuclear weapons at some point in 2018[12]. Other US media proved the existence of the report by citing unnamed officials from the Department of Defense. Another news report by The Washington Post on August 8^th said that by the end of July 2017, North Korea possessed a maximum of 60 nuclear weapons. With miniaturized nuclear warheads, it has in fact become a fully nuclear-armed state.

The US Institute for Science and International Security predicted, based on North Korea’s production of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium, that by the end of 2016, North Korea possessed 13 to 30 nuclear weapons, and the number is still increasing at three to five per year. By 2020, the number may reach 25 to 50, or even 60. [13]

Mike Pompeo, Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), addressing the US Center for Strategic and International Studies on April 13^th, noted that while multiple administrations have tried to cope with the threat of an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of putting a nuclear warhead into the US, we are closer to the threat than we have ever been, since “North Korea has always been making progress.” On August 13^th, during an interview with FOX News, Pompeo contended that North Korea is developing capabilities to conduct nuclear strikes against the US at an astonishing pace. There is only months before North Korea possesses full nuclear force, which is enough to make the US a target. Nonetheless, there are differences between being capable of launching a nuclear bomb and producing a large number of nuclear weapons. Previously, on April 12^th, Dennis Wilder, former Deputy CIA Director during the Bush administration, expressed during an interview with Lateline of Australia’s ABC News that the US intelligence agencies estimate that within four years, or even during Trump’s time in office, North Korea will be able to launch ballistic missiles to the US West Coast.[14]

Experts from the Institute of Strategic Stability of Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation made an assessment that North Korea has produced a total of 40 to 42 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium with the 5-megawatt nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, of which about 10 kilograms were consumed in three nuclear tests conducted in 2006, 2009, and 2013. At present, North Korea has about 20 to 30 implosive plutonium bombs and highly-enriched uranium bombs. It can produce seven nuclear warheads a year, and the number is expected to increase to ten by 2018. These nuclear warheads will be most likely to be used in nuclear bombardment, i.e. dropped by bombers or military transport aircrafts converted from bombers.[15]

II. Frequent nuclear missile activities of North Korea challenge seriousness of international nuclear non-proliferation system, and incur stricter multilateral sanctions.

Since the 1960s, as the number of nuclear weapons and nuclear tests increases, a nuclear order with sovereign countries and international organizations as the actors, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) the basic guarantee system, and using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as principle has gradually taken shape. Due to historical and practical reasons, the current order is still unequal and unfair in some aspects, such as imposing double standards, being increasingly incompatible with reality, and risking being overthrown. Nevertheless, its formation is not only an achievement of human civilization, but a basic guarantee of international security; as such, the current nuclear order should be well maintained, and reformed under conducive situations. At present, stepping out of the security dilemma of the “anarchy” of international community is a key to global nuclear order.

The historical evolution of the North Korean nuclear issue also demonstrates the evolution of the non-proliferation regime of the nuclear order. During the Cold War, North Korea once accepted the nuclear assistance of the Soviet Union. Under the US-Soviet Union nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the Soviet Union was responsible for monitoring nuclear activities in North Korea. However, North Korea refused to put its nuclear facilities and imported materials under the safeguard of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and even leaked secret information regarding its independently developed nuclear weapons. Under these conditions, it was forced by the Soviet Union to join NPT, and it agreed to put its 5MW nuclear reactor in Yongbyon under IAEA supervision.

After the Cold War, the current international nuclear non-proliferation regime was established; however, North Korea intensified its efforts in conducting nuclear missile activities and withdrew from NPT, which severely impacted the regime. North Korea’s nuclear power makes it the first country to successfully break the existing nuclear order in a real sense. It not only implies a retrogression or even disintegration of the current international nuclear non-proliferation regime, but also exposes the problem of a “vital” tottering of the nuclear order. Therefore, it is essential to urge North Korea to return to the regime with proper measures, and prevent “nuclear threshold countries” like Japan and South Korea from following suit and shaking off NPT for the possession of more nuclear weapons.[16]

On June 12^th 2017, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano delivered the Annual Report for 2016. According to the report, since North Korea stopped inviting the IAEA for nuclear monitoring, the agency has not been able to conduct monitoring and verification activities, and thus has only limited information on the development of its nuclear program. Despite this, it is ascertainable that North Korea has not abandoned its nuclear program or suspended related activities in a comprehensive, verifiable, and irreversible manner; instead, it blatantly ignores and continues violating UN resolutions, and refuses all cooperation with IAEA. Yukiya Amano urged the country to comply fully with NPT, and cooperate promptly with IAEA, in order to leverage IAEA’s comprehensive safeguard implementation fully and effectively, and realize the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.[17]

IAEA’s anxiety regarding the development of North Korea’s nuclear power is a reflection of widespread concern in the international community. Since the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 825 in 1993, the Council has passed 12 resolutions and four presidential statements concerning North Korea. In 2017 alone, three UN Security Council resolutions were issued against the country’s nuclear missile activities, during which the attitudes of council members were highly consistent, and the adoption highly effective. It shows that the international community is growing increasingly impatient with North Korea’s nuclear missile activities.

In response to North Korea’s frequent launch of ballistic missiles in April, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2356 on June 2^nd, adding 14 persons to the lists of those subject to asset freeze and travel restrictions, and four entities to asset freeze.

In response to North Korea’s trial launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles on July 4^th and July 28^th, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2371 on August 5^th, imposing more stringent sanctions on North Korea. According to the resolution, North Korea shall not supply, sell or transfer coal, iron, iron ore, other raw materials, and seafood to other countries. Additionally, all member states shall prohibit the opening of new joint ventures or cooperative entities with the North Korean entities and individuals, or expand existing joint ventures through additional investments. It implies a reduction of the country’s revenue by - at minimum - one billion dollars, or roughly one third of its foreign currency revenue.

In response to North Korea’s sixth nuclear test, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted the ninth resolution concerning North Korea since 2006 – Resolution 2375 on September 11^th, issuing new sanctions against the country. The resolution introduces restrictions on petroleum import and crude oil supply to North Korea to the total amount supplied in the period of 12 months prior to the adoption of the resolution, and bans North Korea from procuring gas condensates and natural gas liquids, or exporting textiles. The resolution stipulates that the member states shall not sell to North Korea an amount of crude oil that is in excess of four million barrels, and refined petroleum products that is up to two million barrels per year during a period of 12 months beginning on January 1^st, 2018. In addition, no textile or labor shall be introduced from North Korea; the assets of some North Korean political agencies are frozen; and smuggling to North Korea is prohibited.

When Resolution 2375 was enforced, 90% of North Korea’s export was paralyzed. Based on the trade volume of the sanctioned goods in the last two years, North Korea would lose an income of 1.3 billion dollars a year, and see its export volume drop to 520 million dollars and import volume 1.52 billion dollars in 2018, regressing to 1999 levels.

With the marked improvement of North Korea’s nuclear power and its capricious displays, the international community has noticed not only the country’s irreversible determination to own nuclear weapons, but also the effectiveness of international sanctions. More and more insiders tacitly accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon state. Michael Swaine, from the US Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, proposed that Kim Jong-Un understands that the US could extinguish North Korea in a matter of minutes and would do so if a North Korean nuclear missile struck the US soil. Therefore, Pyongyang will not adopt nuclear strategies without basic rationality. This suggests the short-term need for US policymakers to strengthen communication and coordination with China, South Korea, and other countries, agree upon procedures for detecting and preventing any attempt by North Korea to transfer nuclear materials, and implement effective crisis management, instead of focusing only on deterring the country and forcing it to forsake its nuclear endeavors.[18] Siegfried Hecker, a nuclear scientist from Stanford University, and other US scholars have expressed similar opinions.

Meanwhile, some opposition supporters in South Korea and Japan preach about developing nuclear weapons independently or relocating US tactical nuclear weapons, in order to contend with North Korea’s nuclear programs. On September 14^th, Realmeter, a South Korean polling organization, released results of a survey, saying that 53.5% of the respondents agreed that South Korea should develop nuclear weapons independently or partner with the US in its deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, and only 35.1% opposed this. However, on the same day, during an interview with Cable News Network (CNN), South Korean President Moon Jae-in said that, “I do not agree that South Korea needs to develop our own nuclear weapons or relocate tactical nuclear weapons in the face of North Korea’s nuclear threat. “Though he was not supportive of deploying or pursuing nuclear weapons, Moon said South Korea “needs to develop our military capabilities in the face of North Korea’s nuclear advancement.”[19]

III. Trump’s North Korea policy features “maximum pressure,” and bilateral negotiation seems hard to initiate

After Donald Trump assumed office, he prioritized the North Korea nuclear issue for the security of the Asia-Pacific region. The US demands that the North Korean regime agrees to stop the development of nuclear weapons and denuclearize the peninsula, and that the country is not capable enough to “threaten the US.”[20] To resolve the North Korea nuclear issue, diplomatic solutions are preferred,[21] while military means remain a highlighted alternative.[22]

After North Korea launched the sixth nuclear test and the Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile, the US intensified its efforts in responding to a North Korean ballistic missile threat. It viewed North Korea as the “the greatest security threat,” and emphasized the US Army’s capability of resolving this deadly threat in advance. The US Army “must stand ready” in the face of North Korean provocations to ensure that the US has the necessary military option.[23]

In March 2017, based on an re-assessment of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, the Trump administration availed the opportunity of US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s visit to South Korea, and denounced the former President Barack Obama’s policy of “strategic patience” towards North Korea. Then, on April 26^th, the Trump administration issued a policy statement in response to the North Korea nuclear issue. The statement called North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons “an urgent national security threat and top foreign policy priority” for the US.

After the statement was released, Donald Trump called the full US Congress in a usual move to closed-door briefings held in the White House and Capitol on the threat posed by North Korea and US options in dealing with it.

The Trump administration considered a wide array of policy options, including imposing military attack, overthrowing the North Korean regime, and recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state. Finally, it settled on a North Korea strategy featuring “maximum pressure, engagement” (“maximum pressure” policy). That is, the US will impose maximum pressure on North Korea through economic sanctions and diplomatic means, and thus urge the country to halt its nuclear missile activities without undergoing a regime change. If North Korea were to change its behaviors, the US would start negotiation processes.[24]

The “maximum pressure” policy is formulated under the guidance of the White House National Security Council, with a particular emphasis on homeland defense demands, and a clarified adherence to the principle of “America First” and the ideology of “Peace through Strength.” Half a year since it was adopted, the new policy has demonstrated three main characteristics.

(I) The new policy relies heavily on deterrence by force. Military operation becomes an increasingly prioritized option on the US’s agenda to address the North Korean nuclear and missile crisis. However, the US intends to “draw the bow without shooting” and favors strategic ambiguity and psychological operations, demonstrating the unpredictability of its policies.

Military operation is increasingly prioritized through the following actions: updating Operations Plan 5015 (OPLAN 5015); enhancing the deployment of B-1B bombers, F-22 fighters, nuclear-powered submarines, and other strategic arms, as well as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on the Korean Peninsula; accelerating the pace to prepare for preemptive and targeted strikes in a semi-underground manner; dispatching additional aircraft carriers to the Peninsula for military exercises; increasing the scale of US-South Korea joint military exercises and arranging tasks in a targeted manner; practicing the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea in case of emergency; etc.

Since Trump assumed office, the US military has launched two limited military operations: in April, it executed an airstrike against a Syrian government-controlled airbase, and later dropped its most powerful non-nuclear bombs after targeting ISIS caves in Afghanistan; on May 30^th, it intercepted an intercontinental ballistic missile during the first test of its ground-based intercept system. Both actions were, in a sense, aimed at intimidating North Korea.

The annual “Key Resolve” and “Foal Eagle” military exercises held by the US and South Korea in the first half of 2017 were larger than the previous in terms of total number of troops, involved arms and equipment, and exercised tasks. Rather than carrying out defense-oriented and tactical operations as they once did, the military exercises appeared to be oriented on attacks and strategies. Meanwhile, THAAD interceptors were used for the first time in a military exercise. In August, the US and South Korea kicked off the annual Ulchi-Freedom Guardian exercise, involving approximately 17,500 US service members and 50,000 South Korean soldiers. Though the exercise was smaller than previous ones, the US and South Korean troops were joined by United Nations Command forces from Australia, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, New Zealand, Netherlands, and the UK, hence the greater significance. In November, closely following Trump’s visit to South Korea, the US and South Korea conducted a joint drill with aircraft carrier strike groups in waters off the South Korea’s eastern coast. The drill included three US Navy nuclear-powered aircraft carriers—the USS Ronald Reagan, USS Nimitz, USS Theodore Roosevelt—and eleven Aegis cruisers, joined by seven South Korean naval vessels. The forces worked to enhance the execution of joint operations through escort by aircraft carriers, aerial operations, and aircraft artillery.

The OPLAN 5015 is a secret joint operations plan signed by South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Choi Yoon-hee and Combined Forces Commander Curtis Scaparrotti in June 2015 to replace the old OPLAN 5027 introduced in 1973, which remained in effect for over three decades.

The OPLAN 5015 outlines how the US and South Korean forces would operate during the outbreak of war or some other crisis. It focuses on launching “preemptive” strikes to destroy North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction, military bases, nuclear plants, missile positions, headquarters, and communication facilities, as well as other important targets, and additionally includes plans to “behead” North Korean political and military leadership, enable prompt victories in early stages of conflicts or crises, and minimize losses. During the Key Resolve military exercise conducted in 2016, the US and South Korean forces carried out for the first time part of the OPLAN 5015. Some of its tasks were involved in the Key Resolve, Foal Eagle, and Ulchi-Freedom Guardian military exercises in 2017 as well, to not only demonstrate their determination but also to train the solders. The Washington Post, citing sources from Yonhap News Agency, reported that “the joint forces will also run through their new ‘4D’ operational plan, which details the allies’ preemptive military operations to detect, disrupt, destroy, and defend against North Korea’s nuclear and missile arsenal.”[25]

In order to coordinate with strengthening preparations for war against North Korea, the CIA announced the establishment of a Korea Mission Center on May 10^th. Before that, there were already ten mission centers: six of them covered geographical regions, including the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Europe and Eurasia, Near East, East Asia and Pacific, and South and Central Asia; the other four addressed strategic tasks, including Global Issues, Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, and Weapons and Counterproliferation. The Korea Mission Center is the first one dedicated to dealing with one single country.

On October 28^th, the South Korea-US Security Consultative Meeting was held in Seoul. The South Korean Minister of National Defense Song Young-moo and US Secretary of Defense James Mattis signed a Joint Communiqué following the meeting, stating that the two sides have agreed to intensify the deployment of US strategic assets. In the Joint Communiqué, the Minister and the Secretary expressed their support for diplomatic efforts as the preferred path for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, and agreed that such diplomatic efforts must be backed by robust military powers. The two sides decided to hold talks on revising the Revised Missile Guidelines (RMG) and introducing sophisticated strategic weapons, and to implement - at the earliest opportunity - the decision to remove limits on missile payload under the RMG. Mattis reaffirmed the US commitment to provide extended deterrence for South Korea using a full range of military capabilities, including the US nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities.

Trump attempted to enhance the deterrent effect by frequently making public comments and posting Tweets, aiming to launch psychological operations against North Korea and those maintaining normal relations with the country. To name a few remarks from Trump, “North Korea is behaving very badly. They have been ‘playing’ the United States for years. China has done little to help” (Trump’s tweet on March 18^th); “North Korea is looking for trouble. If China decides to help, that would be great. If not, we will solve the problem without them” (Trump’s tweet on April 11^th); “North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen” (Trump’s comments to reporters on August 8^th); “It (nuclear arsenal) is now far stronger and more powerful than ever before…hopefully we will never have to use this power”(Trump’s tweet on August 9^th); “If North Korea does anything in terms of even thinking about attack of anybody that we love or we represent or our allies or us, they can be very, very nervous. They should be nervous. Things will happen to them like they never thought possible” (Trump’s comments to reporters on August 10^th); “North Korea better get their act together, or they’re going to be in trouble, like few nations ever have been in trouble in this world” (Trump’s comments to reporters on August 10^th).

North Korea was infuriated by Trump’s tweets and comments on August 8^th and 9^th. In response, the Korean People’s Army Strategic Force announced on August 10^th that they would finalize the Guam strike plan by mid-August and present it to Kim Jong-un, Commander in Chief of North Korea’s nuclear force. In the plan, four intermediate-range ballistic missiles would be fired into waters 30-40 km (18-25 miles) from Guam. Responding to this “threat,” Trump tweeted on August 11^th, “Military solutions are now fully in place, locked and loaded, should North Korea act unwisely. Hopefully Kim Jong Un will find another path!” Later on August 30^th, he sent another Tweet: “The US has been talking to North Korea, and paying them extortion money, for 25 years. Talking is not the answer!”

On the day of North Korea’s sixth nuclear test, Trump tweeted that “North Korea has conducted a major Nuclear Test. Their words and actions continue to be very hostile and dangerous to the United States,” and that “the United States is considering, in addition to other options, stopping all trade with any country doing business with North Korea” (Trump’s Tweets on September 3^rd). At the General Debate of the 72^nd Regular Session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA 72), which commenced on September 19^th, Trump delivered his first UNGA speech, in which he mentioned North Korea in particular and referred to his North Korean counterpart as “Little Rocket Man.” “The United States has great strength and patience, but if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea,” stated Trump. The next day, Kim Jong-un, flashing rare anger, released a statement saying that he would “punish the mentally deranged US dotard with fire.” On October 5^th, while taking photos alongside senior military leaders and their spouses before a night dinner at the White House, Trump alluded to “the calm before the storm” after he made remarks about sensitive issues concerning Iran and North Korea. On October 6^th, Trump held a brief interview with reporters in the Oval Office. When asked how he would address North Korean nuclear issue, he replied, “you’ll find out,” and “we’ll see.” On October 7^th, Trump said on Twitter, “Presidents and their administrations have been talking to North Korea for 25 years, agreements made and massive amounts of money paid…hasn’t worked, agreements violated before the ink was dry, making fools of U.S. negotiators. Sorry, but only one thing will work!”

In demonstrating deterrence, Trump seemed to be plain and simple, tough yet cryptic, as if he were playing at strategic ambiguity to intrigue and rattle his opponents, thus further sending the tensions spiraling upwards. When asked about this during an interview with the US National Broadcasting Company on October 8^th, Mick Mulvaney, Director of the Office of Management and Budget of the White House, explained that Trump is clearly telegraphing that military options are on the table to address North Korean issues.

(II) Without drawing a clear “red line,” the US grows tougher with North Korea. Yet in practice, the US prefers a bilateral system to a multilateral mechanism, and tends to bind various issues together and resort to exchanges of interests.

In January 2017, Kim Jong-un said in an address on New Year’s Day that “North Korea is preparing to test long-range missiles.” Trump immediately derided Kim’s claim on Twitter, saying: “It won’t happen.” But he did not make clear what “it” meant, thus giving rise great speculation. It seems that Trump was maintaining “strategic ambiguity” with the “ambiguous reference.” It is generally believed that Trump set a “red line” during his early days in office that North Korea should not conduct its sixth nuclear test or launch any more intercontinental ballistic missiles, a line which was then crossed by Pyongyang. Though North Korea keeps crossing the red line, the Trump administration appears hesitant to take military actions. Currently, the US is mobilizing all forces to impose maximum sanctions against North Korea and increase pressure.

The Trump administration keeps applying significant pressure to North Korea. In addition to multilateral sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, the US and its allies are tightening their unilateral sanctions against North Korea. On June 1^st, two Russian firms were added to the targeted sanctions list of US Department of the Treasury for allegedly helping North Korea breach sanctions and supporting North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. On July 27^th, the US Senate passed a sweeping sanctions package targeting Russia, Iran, and North Korea, following the approval of the House. On August 3^rd, Trump signed the bill. On September 21^st, Trump ordered new sanctions, blacklisting people and entities conducting business with North Korea, and barring ships that had visited North Korea from stopping in the US for 180 days. On September 26^th, the Treasury announced sanctions on eight North Korean banks and twenty-six bank executives for their support of North Korean programs to developing weapons of mass destruction, and froze assets in US jurisdiction belonging to entities and individuals with ties to North Korea’s financial networks. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) would block all North Korean assets subject to US jurisdiction, and forbid sanctions targets from doing business with US citizens. By imposing unilateral sanctions, the US is actually acting in accordance with domestic laws, and carrying out “long-arm jurisdiction” over any third-party entities or individuals doing business with North Korea in areas involved in its sanctions. That is to say, the US is bringing third-party financial institutions and enterprises trading with North Korea into the scope of “secondary sanctions,” which have already been implemented or are about to be carried out.

The US Department of State is working to diplomatically isolate North Korea across the globe. Its actions include requiring other countries to shut down enterprises owned by the North Korean government, cancel registrations of North Korean ships, cancel flights with North Korea’s state-owned airlines, and expel North Korean ambassadors. These actions have delivered a number of results: India announced that it would halt all trade with North Korea and stop training North Korean soldiers; the ASEAN Summit and the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting both released statements, expressing concerns for the situation on the Korean Peninsula and vowing to rigorously implement the UN Security Council resolutions regarding North Korea; Mexico, Peru, Spain, Kuwait, and Italy expelled their North Korean ambassadors; Germany shut down a hostel run by the North Korean embassy; Kuwait and Qatar expelled North Korean workers. The US Department of State claimed that more than 20 countries restricted North Korean diplomatic activities this year.[26]

The Trump administration believes that the key to effective sanctions against North Korea lies in China, who allegedly maintains “special relations” with North Korea, and the administration attempts to transfer the primary responsibility of pressuring Pyongyang to China. Hence, it is working to press China more aggressively to check North Korea’s power than the Obama administration. To this end, the US adopts a “stick and carrot” strategy when dealing with China: the US continues to flatter China with fine words, maintains close high-level contacts with China in diplomatic terms, and signals that China should coordinate with the US to prepare for emergencies on the Peninsula; meanwhile, the US government grumbles publicly, expands its unilateral sanctions against North Korea to include even Chinese businesses and individuals, and connects China-US trade talks to China’s performance dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. In Trump’s tweets concerning the issue, many have scolded both North Korea and China, reflecting the logic above and his mood swings: “I explained to the president of China that a trade deal with the U.S. will be far better for them if they solve the North Korean problem!” (Trump’s tweet on April 11^th); “North Korea disrespected the wishes of China and its highly respected President when it launched, though unsuccessfully, a missile today. Bad!” (Trump’s tweet on April 29^th); “North Korea has just launched another missile. Does this guy have anything better to do with his life? Hard to believe that South Korea and Japan will put up with this much longer. Perhaps China will put a heavy move on North Korea and end this nonsense once and for all!” (Trump’s tweet on July 4^th); “Trade between China and North Korea grew almost 40% in the first quarter. So much for China working with us — but we had to give it a try” (Trump’s tweet on July 5^th); “I am very disappointed in China. Our foolish past leaders have allowed them to make hundreds of billions of dollars a year in trade, yet...they do NOTHING for us with North Korea, just talk. We will no longer allow this to continue. China could easily solve this problem!” (Trump’s tweet on July 29^th). On June 15^th, the US announced a lawsuit against Mingzheng International Trading Ltd., a company based in Shenyang, China, accusing it of acting as a front for laundering money on behalf of a sanctioned North Korean entity. On June 29^th, the US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin announced that the US believed that the Bank of Dandong, a Chinese bank, laundered money for North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, and it will be barred from doing business with the US financial institutions. The Treasury Department had also sanctioned two individuals from China as well as a Chinese shipping company. However, North Korea does not buckle under the increasingly tight international sanctions, and has refused China’s offer to send special envoys to Pyongyang several times. As a result, Trump and his administration must admit that China has only limited influence over North Korea.

(I) The new policy relies heavily on deterrence by force. Military operation becomes an increasingly prioritized option on the US’s agenda to address the North Korean nuclear and missile crisis. However, the US intends to “draw the bow without shooting” and favors strategic ambiguity and psychological operations, demonstrating the unpredictability of its policies.

Military operation is increasingly prioritized through the following actions: updating Operations Plan 5015 (OPLAN 5015); enhancing the deployment of B-1B bombers, F-22 fighters, nuclear-powered submarines, and other strategic arms, as well as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on the Korean Peninsula; accelerating the pace to prepare for preemptive and targeted strikes in a semi-underground manner; dispatching additional aircraft carriers to the Peninsula for military exercises; increasing the scale of US-South Korea joint military exercises and arranging tasks in a targeted manner; practicing the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea in case of emergency; etc.

Since Trump assumed office, the US military has launched two limited military operations: in April, it executed an airstrike against a Syrian government-controlled airbase, and later dropped its most powerful non-nuclear bombs after targeting ISIS caves in Afghanistan; on May 30^th, it intercepted an intercontinental ballistic missile during the first test of its ground-based intercept system. Both actions were, in a sense, aimed at intimidating North Korea.

The annual “Key Resolve” and “Foal Eagle” military exercises held by the US and South Korea in the first half of 2017 were larger than the previous in terms of total number of troops, involved arms and equipment, and exercised tasks. Rather than carrying out defense-oriented and tactical operations as they once did, the military exercises appeared to be oriented on attacks and strategies. Meanwhile, THAAD interceptors were used for the first time in a military exercise. In August, the US and South Korea kicked off the annual Ulchi-Freedom Guardian exercise, involving approximately 17,500 US service members and 50,000 South Korean soldiers. Though the exercise was smaller than previous ones, the US and South Korean troops were joined by United Nations Command forces from Australia, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, New Zealand, Netherlands, and the UK, hence the greater significance. In November, closely following Trump’s visit to South Korea, the US and South Korea conducted a joint drill with aircraft carrier strike groups in waters off the South Korea’s eastern coast. The drill included three US Navy nuclear-powered aircraft carriers—the USS Ronald Reagan, USS Nimitz, USS Theodore Roosevelt—and eleven Aegis cruisers, joined by seven South Korean naval vessels. The forces worked to enhance the execution of joint operations through escort by aircraft carriers, aerial operations, and aircraft artillery.

The OPLAN 5015 is a secret joint operations plan signed by South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Choi Yoon-hee and Combined Forces Commander Curtis Scaparrotti in June 2015 to replace the old OPLAN 5027 introduced in 1973, which remained in effect for over three decades.

The OPLAN 5015 outlines how the US and South Korean forces would operate during the outbreak of war or some other crisis. It focuses on launching “preemptive” strikes to destroy North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction, military bases, nuclear plants, missile positions, headquarters, and communication facilities, as well as other important targets, and additionally includes plans to “behead” North Korean political and military leadership, enable prompt victories in early stages of conflicts or crises, and minimize losses. During the Key Resolve military exercise conducted in 2016, the US and South Korean forces carried out for the first time part of the OPLAN 5015. Some of its tasks were involved in the Key Resolve, Foal Eagle, and Ulchi-Freedom Guardian military exercises in 2017 as well, to not only demonstrate their determination but also to train the solders. The Washington Post, citing sources from Yonhap News Agency, reported that “the joint forces will also run through their new ‘4D’ operational plan, which details the allies’ preemptive military operations to detect, disrupt, destroy, and defend against North Korea’s nuclear and missile arsenal.”[27]

In order to coordinate with strengthening preparations for war against North Korea, the CIA announced the establishment of a Korea Mission Center on May 10^th. Before that, there were already ten mission centers: six of them covered geographical regions, including the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Europe and Eurasia, Near East, East Asia and Pacific, and South and Central Asia; the other four addressed strategic tasks, including Global Issues, Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, and Weapons and Counterproliferation. The Korea Mission Center is the first one dedicated to dealing with one single country.

On October 28^th, the South Korea-US Security Consultative Meeting was held in Seoul. The South Korean Minister of National Defense Song Young-moo and US Secretary of Defense James Mattis signed a Joint Communiqué following the meeting, stating that the two sides have agreed to intensify the deployment of US strategic assets. In the Joint Communiqué, the Minister and the Secretary expressed their support for diplomatic efforts as the preferred path for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, and agreed that such diplomatic efforts must be backed by robust military powers. The two sides decided to hold talks on revising the Revised Missile Guidelines (RMG) and introducing sophisticated strategic weapons, and to implement - at the earliest opportunity - the decision to remove limits on missile payload under the RMG. Mattis reaffirmed the US commitment to provide extended deterrence for South Korea using a full range of military capabilities, including the US nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities.

Trump attempted to enhance the deterrent effect by frequently making public comments and posting Tweets, aiming to launch psychological operations against North Korea and those maintaining normal relations with the country. To name a few remarks from Trump, “North Korea is behaving very badly. They have been ‘playing’ the United States for years. China has done little to help” (Trump’s tweet on March 18^th); “North Korea is looking for trouble. If China decides to help, that would be great. If not, we will solve the problem without them” (Trump’s tweet on April 11^th); “North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen” (Trump’s comments to reporters on August 8^th); “It (nuclear arsenal) is now far stronger and more powerful than ever before…hopefully we will never have to use this power”(Trump’s tweet on August 9^th); “If North Korea does anything in terms of even thinking about attack of anybody that we love or we represent or our allies or us, they can be very, very nervous. They should be nervous. Things will happen to them like they never thought possible” (Trump’s comments to reporters on August 10^th); “North Korea better get their act together, or they’re going to be in trouble, like few nations ever have been in trouble in this world” (Trump’s comments to reporters on August 10^th).

North Korea was infuriated by Trump’s tweets and comments on August 8^th and 9^th. In response, the Korean People’s Army Strategic Force announced on August 10^th that they would finalize the Guam strike plan by mid-August and present it to Kim Jong-un, Commander in Chief of North Korea’s nuclear force. In the plan, four intermediate-range ballistic missiles would be fired into waters 30-40 km (18-25 miles) from Guam. Responding to this “threat,” Trump tweeted on August 11^th, “Military solutions are now fully in place, locked and loaded, should North Korea act unwisely. Hopefully Kim Jong Un will find another path!” Later on August 30^th, he sent another Tweet: “The US has been talking to North Korea, and paying them extortion money, for 25 years. Talking is not the answer!”

On the day of North Korea’s sixth nuclear test, Trump tweeted that “North Korea has conducted a major Nuclear Test. Their words and actions continue to be very hostile and dangerous to the United States,” and that “the United States is considering, in addition to other options, stopping all trade with any country doing business with North Korea” (Trump’s Tweets on September 3^rd). At the General Debate of the 72^nd Regular Session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA 72), which commenced on September 19^th, Trump delivered his first UNGA speech, in which he mentioned North Korea in particular and referred to his North Korean counterpart as “Little Rocket Man.” “The United States has great strength and patience, but if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea,” stated Trump. The next day, Kim Jong-un, flashing rare anger, released a statement saying that he would “punish the mentally deranged US dotard with fire.” On October 5^th, while taking photos alongside senior military leaders and their spouses before a night dinner at the White House, Trump alluded to “the calm before the storm” after he made remarks about sensitive issues concerning Iran and North Korea. On October 6^th, Trump held a brief interview with reporters in the Oval Office. When asked how he would address North Korean nuclear issue, he replied, “you’ll find out,” and “we’ll see.” On October 7^th, Trump said on Twitter, “Presidents and their administrations have been talking to North Korea for 25 years, agreements made and massive amounts of money paid…hasn’t worked, agreements violated before the ink was dry, making fools of U.S. negotiators. Sorry, but only one thing will work!”

In demonstrating deterrence, Trump seemed to be plain and simple, tough yet cryptic, as if he were playing at strategic ambiguity to intrigue and rattle his opponents, thus further sending the tensions spiraling upwards. When asked about this during an interview with the US National Broadcasting Company on October 8^th, Mick Mulvaney, Director of the Office of Management and Budget of the White House, explained that Trump is clearly telegraphing that military options are on the table to address North Korean issues.

(II) Without drawing a clear “red line,” the US grows tougher with North Korea. Yet in practice, the US prefers a bilateral system to a multilateral mechanism, and tends to bind various issues together and resort to exchanges of interests.

In January 2017, Kim Jong-un said in an address on New Year’s Day that “North Korea is preparing to test long-range missiles.” Trump immediately derided Kim’s claim on Twitter, saying: “It won’t happen.” But he did not make clear what “it” meant, thus giving rise great speculation. It seems that Trump was maintaining “strategic ambiguity” with the “ambiguous reference.” It is generally believed that Trump set a “red line” during his early days in office that North Korea should not conduct its sixth nuclear test or launch any more intercontinental ballistic missiles, a line which was then crossed by Pyongyang. Though North Korea keeps crossing the red line, the Trump administration appears hesitant to take military actions. Currently, the US is mobilizing all forces to impose maximum sanctions against North Korea and increase pressure.

The Trump administration keeps applying significant pressure to North Korea. In addition to multilateral sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, the US and its allies are tightening their unilateral sanctions against North Korea. On June 1^st, two Russian firms were added to the targeted sanctions list of US Department of the Treasury for allegedly helping North Korea breach sanctions and supporting North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. On July 27^th, the US Senate passed a sweeping sanctions package targeting Russia, Iran, and North Korea, following the approval of the House. On August 3^rd, Trump signed the bill. On September 21^st, Trump ordered new sanctions, blacklisting people and entities conducting business with North Korea, and barring ships that had visited North Korea from stopping in the US for 180 days. On September 26^th, the Treasury announced sanctions on eight North Korean banks and twenty-six bank executives for their support of North Korean programs to developing weapons of mass destruction, and froze assets in US jurisdiction belonging to entities and individuals with ties to North Korea’s financial networks. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) would block all North Korean assets subject to US jurisdiction, and forbid sanctions targets from doing business with US citizens. By imposing unilateral sanctions, the US is actually acting in accordance with domestic laws, and carrying out “long-arm jurisdiction” over any third-party entities or individuals doing business with North Korea in areas involved in its sanctions. That is to say, the US is bringing third-party financial institutions and enterprises trading with North Korea into the scope of “secondary sanctions,” which have already been implemented or are about to be carried out.

The US Department of State is working to diplomatically isolate North Korea across the globe. Its actions include requiring other countries to shut down enterprises owned by the North Korean government, cancel registrations of North Korean ships, cancel flights with North Korea’s state-owned airlines, and expel North Korean ambassadors. These actions have delivered a number of results: India announced that it would halt all trade with North Korea and stop training North Korean soldiers; the ASEAN Summit and the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting both released statements, expressing concerns for the situation on the Korean Peninsula and vowing to rigorously implement the UN Security Council resolutions regarding North Korea; Mexico, Peru, Spain, Kuwait, and Italy expelled their North Korean ambassadors; Germany shut down a hostel run by the North Korean embassy; Kuwait and Qatar expelled North Korean workers. The US Department of State claimed that more than 20 countries restricted North Korean diplomatic activities this year.[28]

The Trump administration believes that the key to effective sanctions against North Korea lies in China, who allegedly maintains “special relations” with North Korea, and the administration attempts to transfer the primary responsibility of pressuring Pyongyang to China. Hence, it is working to press China more aggressively to check North Korea’s power than the Obama administration. To this end, the US adopts a “stick and carrot” strategy when dealing with China: the US continues to flatter China with fine words, maintains close high-level contacts with China in diplomatic terms, and signals that China should coordinate with the US to prepare for emergencies on the Peninsula; meanwhile, the US government grumbles publicly, expands its unilateral sanctions against North Korea to include even Chinese businesses and individuals, and connects China-US trade talks to China’s performance dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. In Trump’s tweets concerning the issue, many have scolded both North Korea and China, reflecting the logic above and his mood swings: “I explained to the president of China that a trade deal with the U.S. will be far better for them if they solve the North Korean problem!” (Trump’s tweet on April 11^th); “North Korea disrespected the wishes of China and its highly respected President when it launched, though unsuccessfully, a missile today. Bad!” (Trump’s tweet on April 29^th); “North Korea has just launched another missile. Does this guy have anything better to do with his life? Hard to believe that South Korea and Japan will put up with this much longer. Perhaps China will put a heavy move on North Korea and end this nonsense once and for all!” (Trump’s tweet on July 4^th); “Trade between China and North Korea grew almost 40% in the first quarter. So much for China working with us — but we had to give it a try” (Trump’s tweet on July 5^th); “I am very disappointed in China. Our foolish past leaders have allowed them to make hundreds of billions of dollars a year in trade, yet...they do NOTHING for us with North Korea, just talk. We will no longer allow this to continue. China could easily solve this problem!” (Trump’s tweet on July 29^th). On June 15^th, the US announced a lawsuit against Mingzheng International Trading Ltd., a company based in Shenyang, China, accusing it of acting as a front for laundering money on behalf of a sanctioned North Korean entity. On June 29^th, the US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin announced that the US believed that the Bank of Dandong, a Chinese bank, laundered money for North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, and it will be barred from doing business with the US financial institutions. The Treasury Department had also sanctioned two individuals from China as well as a Chinese shipping company. However, North Korea does not buckle under the increasingly tight international sanctions, and has refused China’s offer to send special envoys to Pyongyang several times. As a result, Trump and his administration must admit that China has only limited influence over North Korea.

(III) In addition to tough actions, the US also plays the villain by maintaining contacts with North Korea, prioritizing the diplomatic solution, and retaining the possibility of talks, so as to offer “sweeter carrots.”

First, the US still signals the possibility of a talk with Kim Jong-un. During an interview with Reuters on February 23^rd, Trump expressed worry about North Korea conducting missile tests. Meanwhile, he did not rule out the possibility of meeting the North Korean leader under certain circumstances, but it was probably “too late.” On May 1^st, Trump said in an interview with Bloomberg in the White House, “If it would be appropriate for me to meet with him, I would absolutely be honored to do it. If it's under the, again, under the right circumstances.” “Most political people would never say that,” he noted. “But I'm telling you under the right circumstances I would meet with him."[29] On November 6^th, during his visit to Japan, Trump reiterated that the North Korean nuclear programs pose a threat to the civilized world as well as international peace and stability, and that the era of strategic patience is over. Meanwhile, he said, “I would sit down with anybody. I don’t think it’s a strength or weakness, I think sitting down with people is not a bad thing.” “So I would certainly be open to doing that but we’ll see where it goes, I think we’re far too early,”[30] he added.

Secondly, the US put forward the principle of “two give-ups” and “four nots” for addressing North Korean nuclear issue. The principle was gradually developed by the US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson as he participated in a special interview during his Asia visit in March, chaired the UN Security Council Ministerial Session on North Korea on April 28^th, and delivered an open speech on May 3^rd. It means that, under the condition that North Korea gives up nuclear tests and missile development, the US will not try to seek change in North Korea’s national system, overthrow Kim Jong-un’s regime, push for South-North reunification, or cross the 38^th parallel and attack North Korea.[31] To be fair, such overtures are ahead of those made by the Obama administration. In particular, it shows a clearer official sign that the US has no desire to overthrow the North Korean regime, which serves as the prerequisite for talks between the Trump administration and North Korea. In regards to this, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang replied to an inquiry on May 8^th, starting, “We have noted the remarks by Secretary Tillerson, the principles he mentioned, and the commitment of the US to promoting denuclearization of the Peninsula.” “Under the current circumstances, the message sent by the US about solving problems through dialogue and consultation is of positive significance and worth serious consideration by relevant parties.”[32] China hopes the US can, based on these statements, strengthen contact with North Korea to seek consensus and build mutual trust.

Thirdly, the US held limited low-level contacts with North Korea. On May 8^th, the US had a tentative 1.5-track dialogue with North Korea in Oslo, Norway, where the two sides were represented by senior researcher Suzanne DiMaggio from New America Foundation, a think tank headquartered in Washington, and Choi Sun-hee, Director General of the North America Department of the North Korean Foreign Ministry (as a researcher at a subordinate body of the North Korean Foreign Ministry). This was the second meeting between US and North Korea since their contact in Geneva, Switzerland, in November 2016. It was reported that the meeting, which possibly lasted for two days, mainly discussed the release of US citizens detained in North Korea, but the US still tried to elicit terms of negotiation for North Korea.[33]

Generally speaking, the secret bilateral contact between the US and North Korea is mainly done through New York, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and European channels, which have never been fully cut off even in times of greatest tension for US-North Korea relations and the Korean Peninsula. On September 30^th, Secretary of State Tillerson, in response to the inquiry of reporters during his visit to China, confessed, “We have lines of communication to Pyongyang. We’re not in a dark situation, a blackout. We have a couple … three channels open to Pyongyang.” “We can talk to them, we do talk to them,” he further noted. Following the remarks, the next day, Trump mocked Tillerson in a tweet: “I told Rex Tillerson, our wonderful Secretary of State, that he is wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man.” Nonetheless, this still implicitly proved that mid- and low-level contact between the two states does exist.

On the whole, though blatantly abandoning “strategic patience,” the Trump administration has adopted more or less the same policies from the Obama administration. After several rounds, Trump has gained a deeper understanding of the complexity and urgency regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. Though he claimed that Obama’s era of “strategic patience” has ended, Trump has actually extended the policy, using the “stick and carrot” approach and continuing the hedging strategy. Main difference, if any, is to place all options on the table like in business negotiations, and apply oppressive and seductive measures to the greatest extent to highlight the commitment to “Peace through Strength” and pursue stronger domestic political execution capabilities than Trump’s predecessor. For now at least, Trump has not formed much strategic thinking or any long-term plan on the North Korean nuclear issue, nor has he profoundly thought about fundamentally solving the issue. The stress reactions that prevail reflect his pragmatism. It can even be said that Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy is the “extended version” of the Obama policy.[34]

Launching military attack against North Korea, physically wiping out the North Korean leadership, and changing its regime with special means are all extremely risky options with little certainty of realizing the expected goal and no control over the consequences. Therefore, rather than hastily resort to a military approach, the calculating Trump can only continue to “prioritize diplomatic solutions.” Even though the US turned each violation of UN Security Council resolution by North Korea into more stringent sanctions, the effect has been limited in the last two years. Despite progressive external sanctions and blockade, the North Korean domestic economy in Kim Jong-un’s times does not seem worse than that in Kim Jong Il’s, as economic growth was around 1% in both 2015 and 2016, compared with slow growth of 0.8% to 1.3% from 2011 to 2015.[35] In 2016, domestic grain yield increased by 7% to 4.81 million tons, which met people’s minimum demand and has been unrivalled since the grain shortage in the mid-1990s.[36] Facing Kim Jong-un’s “double strategy” focusing on both nuclear and missile development and people’s livelihood, the harsher “stick” used by the US is not enough to push North Korea to the “critical level” for endogenous changes.

Soon after the Trump administration intended to offer a “carrot” to North Korea, a series of events rendered such policy ill-timed: substantive breakthrough in North Korea’s nuclear and missile technologies, assassination of Kim Jong-un’s elder brother Kim Jong-nam in Malaysia in February 2017, and the 17-month detention of US college student Otto Warmbier, who was declared vegetative and died soon after his release in June. Trump was forced to stress further sanctions and dialogue with allies to extend strategic deterrence.

It seems that senior US officials consider the North Korean nuclear and missile issues as a “credible nuclear threat.” However, it remains doubtful as to how many reliable and effective solutions and means the US side has to solve this issue— whether they use an iron hand or velvet gloves. Just as the Washington Post pointed out in an article on April 14^th, there are several unanswered questions about the Trump administration’s North Korea policy: What assurances can the United States give China about what would happen if the Kim regime does collapse? What exactly are the steps Pyongyang must take before engagement becomes viable? In what form will that engagement materialize? Are key allies such as Japan and South Korea on board?[37]

IV. Despite enormous pressure regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, China sticks to the goal of denuclearization and a peaceful settlement via talks, which has gradually gained understanding and recognition in the international community.

In 2017, China’s role in the North Korean nuclear issue has received much attention. For one thing, the Trump administration, disregarding China’s effort to mediate the Six-Party Talks, is attacking China through political approaches and public opinion. By disseminating the rhetoric that “China is the only country that can curb North Korea” and “China has not performed its duties on the North Korean nuclear issue,” they placed the issue at the top of the security agenda in China-US relations and regarded China as the key to effectively impose more stringent sanctions, with an aim to transfer the pressure of North Korean nuclear crisis to China.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration upgraded US policies toward Asia-Pacific into the so-called “Indo-Pacific Strategy.” In the name of responding to “North Korean nuclear and missile threats,” the US accelerated deploying and upgrading strategic weapons on the Korean Peninsula, including pushing forward THAAD deployment in South Korea, which has further changed the situation of strategic security in Northeast Asia and exposed China to greater strategic pressure. Additionally, North Korean nuclear missile behaviors, which are gradually spinning out of control, triggered concern worldwide. Based on the stereotype that China has “special influence” over North Korea, the international community has expressed much skepticism and criticism over China’s willingness to contain the worsening situation in North Korea.

On September 6^th, Future of U.S. Sanctions Task Force, founded by Center for a New American Security early in 2017, made an assessment on China’s fulfillment of “duties of sanctioning North Korea” when giving suggestions to the Trump administration on effectively carrying out sanctions against Pyongyang. The conclusion reflected what the US itself believed: China’s performance in carrying out resolutions to impose sanctions on North Korea has been unsatisfactory.

One reason for this was that the special relations between the two countries undermined China’s political will to crack down trade with North Korea; the other was that “corruption” prevailed in China, especially in frontier defense and other public security forces. The report from Center for a New American Security also argued that China needs to make a clearer political gesture that it will fully carry out the new resolutions to impose sanctions against North Korea, and will make coordinated efforts to enhance compliance with the resolutions, including allocating more central government resources to the North Korean border for cargo inspection to ensure that banned trades are completely blocked in the border areas. As 90% of North Korean foreign trade is linked with China, the compliance of Chinese companies and custom with sanction acts and resolutions regarding North Korea is the key to the success of these sanction measures.[38]

Facing increasing tension due to the North Korean situation and doubts regarding China’s role, China has been calm in clarifying its stance and pointing out the essence of the conflict. By proposing a tie-breaking plan featuring “two suspensions” and a “dual-track approach,” China actively promoted dialogues and prevented conflict. Meanwhile, based on national interests, China safeguards and presides over the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula through adherence to the general goal of denuclearization and peaceful settlement via talks, and fully, accurately, seriously, and strictly carrying out relevant resolutions from the UN Security Council. In this process, China-US communication has played a vital role.

(I) China remains in frequent touch and coordinates with top US leadership to exert positive influence on Trump administration and drive US position closer to China.

In 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping held three meetings and nine calls with US President Trump, with North Korean nuclear issue as a key topic.

On April 6^th and 7^th, Chinese President Xi Jinping held the first meeting with US President Trump at Mar-a-Lago in Florida, USA. Regarding the nuclear activities on the Korean Peninsula, China reiterated its commitment to denuclearization of the Peninsula, maintenance of peace and stability there, and settlement via peace talks. China will continue to fully carry out UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea. China introduced its “dual-track approach” and suggestion on “two suspensions” to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, hoping to find opportunities for restarting talks. China also reiterated its opposition to US deployment of THAAD in South Korea. Both sides confirmed their commitment to the denuclearization of the Peninsula and agreed to maintain close contact and coordination on the issue. Agreement was also reached on expanding cooperation on dealing with global challenges such as non-proliferation and transnational crime.[39]

News from various sources show that in this important presidential meeting, the Chinese leader spent a relatively long time discussing the historical proceedings of the North Korean nuclear issue, during which he explained China’s position in detail. This “cultivated” the new US leader, and this was implicitly proved by Trump during an interview with Wall Street Journal on April 12^th. He said, that President Xi “went into the history of China and Korea. Not North Korea, Korea. And you know, you're talking about thousands of years ...and many wars. And Korea actually used to be a part of China. And after listening for 10 minutes I realized that not—it's not so easy.”[40]

From November 8^th to 10^th, the US President Trump had a state visit to China, when the two heads of state exchanged in-depth views on China-US relations and major international and regional issues of common concern. President Xi Jinping fully explained China’s consistent position on the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. Both sides agreed to commit to maintaining the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, reaffirmed their commitments to the comprehensive, verifiable, and irreversible goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, and did not recognize North Korea as a nuclear state. Both sides believed that nuclear and missile tests by North Korea violated relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and agreed to continue fully and strictly implementing relevant UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea for renewed pressure on North Korean nuclear and missile activities. Meanwhile, both sides should push efforts to peaceful settlement via talks and address reasonable concerns of all parties. Both sides agreed to maintain contact regarding future trends on the Peninsula and corresponding measures by China and the US, and continue to strengthen communication and cooperation via existing mechanisms. Both sides stressed the common goal in the final settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula via talks, and would work to maintain peace and stability on the Peninsula.[41]

When the two heads of state jointly met the press on November 9^th, Xi Jinping stated that China and the US reaffirmed their firm commitments to realizing the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and maintaining the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Both sides commit to resolve the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiation, and stand ready to jointly discuss with all parties concerned the effective approach for realizing long-lasting peace and stability on the Peninsula and Northeast Asia. Trump reiterated during the press meeting that the US and China jointly commit to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

China and US have both common interests and serious disagreements regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. The consensus lies in the following: both sides stick to the goal of denuclearizing Korean Peninsula, oppose North Korea’s possession of nuclear capabilities, and hope to bring it back to negotiations; both sides agree to pressure North Korea to maintain the denuclearization goal, including international sanctions; both sides are firmly against the dissemination of nuclear and missile technologies and materials, and agree to uphold the international non-proliferation regime.

There is also much divergence: the US believes all options can be put on the table, and sticks to stronger deterrence of force by not excluding the greater possibility of military settlement, and not giving up on the idea of overthrowing the North Korean regime; China firmly opposes military settlement, advocates a peaceful and orderly Peninsula, and consistently emphasizes peaceful settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue via talks and negotiations; the US believes that China can play a more substantial role in exerting pressure on North Korea, whereas China has always been alert to US shifting responsibilities and pressure. Being preoccupied with other intentions, the US has been increasing deployment of strategic weapons in Northeast Asia in the name of preventing the nuclear and missile threat of North Korea, especially the missile defense system, which upsets the strategic balance in the region; China must balance its own strategic and security interests in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue, as well as the China-US strategic confrontation. Anyways, as the two critical parties with major stake in the North Korean nuclear issue, China and the US strengthened strategic coordination despite tension. It can be said that with a year’s unswerving effort, China has made significant achievements, and the US is drawing closer to China’s position.

(III). Support UN Security Council to take further actions, adopt necessary measures for strict implementation of UN resolutions concerning North Korea, and thus earnestly play the role as a major responsible country.

China voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 2356 and Resolution 2375. On February 18^th, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the General Administration of Customs (GAC) jointly announced a suspension of coal import from North Korea as of February 19^th for the remainder of this year. On August 14^th, the MOFCOM and GAC jointly announced a ban on all imports of aquatic products, coal, iron, iron ore, lead, and lead ore from North Korea as of August 15^th. On September 11^th, the People’s Bank of China issued a notice to the whole industry, and demanded that financial agencies and specific non-financial institutions register related individuals and entities in their system and conduct retrospective investigation once they receive notice to carry out relevant UN Security Council resolutions from the foreign ministry. On September 22^nd, the MOFCOM and GAC announced that China would restrict the export of refined petroleum products to North Korea, and comprehensively prohibit the import of textiles from North Korea and the export of condensate oil and liquefied natural gas to the country. On September 28^th, the MOFCOM announced that any Sino-foreign equity joint venture, Sino-foreign cooperative joint venture, or wholly foreign-owned enterprise established within the territory of China by an entity or individual from North Koreashall would be shut down within 120 days from the date of adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 2375; any equity or cooperative joint venture established outside China by a Chinese enterprise with an entity or individual from North Korea shall also be shut down accordingly.

Furthermore, China opposes any unilateral sanctions imposed outside the framework of the UN Security Council, especially the so-called “long-arm jurisdiction” implemented by some countries in accordance with their domestic laws, and conducted necessary diplomatic negotiations. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson has reiterated that, in principle, China has been implementing the Security Council resolutions comprehensively and earnestly and fulfilling its international obligations. For Chinese enterprises and individuals, if any violation is found against the Security Council resolutions, China will deal with it according to Chinese laws and regulations. China strongly urges the US to immediately correct its practices so that bilateral cooperation on relevant issues would not be affected.

(IV). Propose the “dual-track approach” and the “suspension-for-suspension” initiative in face of Korean Peninsula crisis, and gradually gain international community acknowledgement though running into resistance from North Korea, the US and South Korea.

On March 8^th, at the press conference for the fifth session of 12^th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and the fifth session of the 12^th National People’s Congress, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi remarked that to defuse the looming crisis on the peninsula, China proposes, as a first step, North Korea suspends its missile and nuclear activities in exchange for a halt of the large-scale US-South Korea exercises. This “suspension-for-suspension” can help break out of the “security dilemma” and bring the parties back to the negotiating table. Then the countries can follow the dual-track approach of denuclearizing the peninsula and establishing a peace mechanism. Only by addressing the parties’ concerns in a synchronized and reciprocal manner, can we find a fundamental solution to lasting peace and stability on the peninsula. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also noted that China’s proposal, fully in keeping with UN resolutions, tries to get to the crux of the matter. To resolve the nuclear issue, China must walk on both legs, which means not just implementing sanctions, but also restarting talks, both of which are set out in the Security Council resolutions.[42]

On April 28^th, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attended the Open Ministerial Meeting of the UN Security Council on the Korean Nuclear Issue, and acknowledged that, “the situation is highly likely to spiral out of control.” He also noted that China will adhere to two basic directions no matter what happens. One is to realize the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; the other is to resolve it peacefully through dialogue and negotiations. Wang Yi further introduced China’s “dual-track approach” and “suspension-for-suspension” proposal. The “dual-track approach,” following the principles of synchronization and reciprocity, aims to denuclearize the peninsula and establish a peace mechanism, and finally solves them together. The “suspension-for-suspension” proposal is to propel the two sides in the Korean Peninsula issue back to negotiation table through the suspension of North Korea’s nuclear missiles tests and the joint military exercises held by the US and South Korea, so as to start the first step of the “dual-track” mechanism. These schemes combine the short-term goal with the long-term goal and complement one another. They not only focus on resolving the most pressing concerns of all sides, but also to pave the road for North Korean denuclearization. Wang Yi also stressed that the most important thing at present is to stop North Korea’s nuclear missile development process. To achieve this, all parties must put aside their self-interest, shelve the argument of who is wrong and pick the “ripe fruits” first, solving difficult problems for the peace of the Korean Peninsula and creating conditions for the stability of the region.[43]

On September 7^th, Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Krishna Bahadur Mahara of Nepal jointly met the press in Beijing after their talks. Less than a week before, North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test. Wang Yi commented that this nuclear test severely violated the UN Security Council resolutions and impacted the international nuclear non-proliferation system, to which China is resolutely opposed. China hopes North Korea could have a clear picture of the situation, make correct judgment and choice, stop acting willfully and cease defiance of the consensus and baseline of the international community once again. China believes that sanctions and pressure are just half of the solution to addressing the issue, and the other half is dialogue and negotiation. Only with the combination of sanction and dialogue can the peninsula nuclear issue be resolved.[44]

On September 21^st, Foreign Minister Wang Yi attended and delivered a speech at the General Debate of the 72^nd Session of the UN General Assembly. On the North Korean nuclear issue, Wang Yi emphasized that China has always been a force for peace. China has made unremitting efforts for peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. No matter how the situation evolves, no matter how long it takes, and no matter what difficulties lie ahead, China will remain committed to the goal of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, stick to the direction of dialogue and negotiation, and firmly uphold regional peace and stability.[45]

However, China did not see positive response from the US, South Korea, and North Korea after it proposed the “dual-track approach” and the “suspension-for-suspension” initiative.

North Korea stressed that, regarding its sovereignty, it has the right to develop nuclear weapons to defend national independence and ensure its existence. Only if the US firstly abandons its hostile policies against North Korea, can there be possible negotiations on suspending nuclear tests.

The attitude of North Korea coincides with China’s suggestions to some degree. In an interview with Indian press on April 19^th, the North Korean ambassador to India, Kye Chun-yong, said that, “Under certain circumstances, we are willing to talk in terms of freezing nuclear testing or missile testing.. For instance, if the American side completely stops big, large-scale military exercises temporarily or permanently, then we will also temporarily stop. Let’s talk about how to solve the Korean issue peacefully.”

Meanwhile, North Korea seems to be resentful about China. Aside from dispatching Kim Yong Jae, the country’s minister for external economic relations to the Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing in May, there was no substantive high-level reciprocal visit ever since. It was not until Song Tao, special envoy to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and Director of the International Department, Central Committee of CPC, visited North Korea from November 17^th to November 20^th with the task of “giving a briefing on the recently concluded 19^th CPC National Congress” that the deadlock was broken.[46]

The US and South Korea dismissed China’s “suspension-for-suspension” proposal. The UN Security Council met behind closed doors on March 8^th, and discussed North Korea’s missile development. The incumbent US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley noted that as North Korea continued to conduct nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches, US military action remained on the table. On the same day, White House spokesman Sean Spicer said that the US would continue to work with South Korea, and ensure that it has the essential military force to defend itself. Then, a US State Department spokesman said to the press: “We remain open to dialogue with North Korea with the aim of returning to credible and authentic negotiations on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” while noting that “the onus is on DPRK to take meaningful actions toward denuclearization and refrain from provocations,” and furthermore, “Our joint military exercises are transparent, they’re defense-oriented, and have been carried out regularly and openly under the Combined Forces Command for going on 40 years.” Conducted as a clear demonstration of the US commitment to the alliance, the military exercise is designed to increase readiness to defend South Korea, to protect the region, and to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula. “It’s not a fair trade” for the US accept a simultaneous suspension of the US-South Korea joint exercises. According to Sputnik, UN Ambassador Nikki Haley said on September 4^th that the US strongly opposes the proposal of suspending the US-South Korea joint exercises in exchange for North Korea’s end to nuclear tests and missile launching. “When a rogue regime has a nuclear weapon and an ICBM pointed at you, you do not take steps to lower your guard. No one would do that.”

On June 22^nd, during a regular press briefing, South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman Cho June-hyuck stressed that North Korean nuclear and missile tests are violations of international law, but the annual joint exercise of South Korea is only for defensive purposes and is carried out legitimately. On August 25^th, after a meeting with her Russian counterpart Sergej Lawrow, South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha expressed similar opinions with Nikki Haley, vetoing the “unreasonable” suspension-for-suspension proposal.[47]

Nevertheless, South Korea did not reject the “dual-track approach” and the “suspension-for-suspension” initiative entirely. In many internal dialogues and academic exchanges, South Korea expressed that they might have only limited understanding of China’s proposal, and thus need to study its rationale more. Since October, there has been a turnaround in China-South Korea relations caused by THAAD trouble, and the Moon Jae-in administration stepped up its efforts in formulating the “New Northern Policy.” It remains to be seen whether South Korea takes a similar approach to the North Korean nuclear issue with China.

V. More active in coordinating the North Korea nuclear issue, Russia is expected to be an important channel facilitating peaceful settlement of Korean Peninsula issues through dialogues.

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia took an on-looker’s attitude towards the security affairs of the Korean Peninsula, while taking initiative in developing diplomatic relations with South Korea mainly out of economic considerations. After Putin assumed office in 2000, under the guidance of the national rejuvenation strategy and “turn to the East” policy, Russia gradually paid more attention and put more effort into the Korean Peninsula affairs. Once, during a round of Six-Party Talks, Russia attempted to mediate along with the US and China as an equal, and engaged in promoting the resolution of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian security issues. As the international rumor goes, when Putin visited North Korea in July 2000, he reached a verbal agreement with former president Kim Jong-Il that North Korea would conditionally give up its ballistic missile programs, and Russia would act as the “guarantor.” After this visit, Russia tried hard to communicate to the international community that this verbal agreement might be formalized as long as all relevant parties work actively.

In October 2002, North Korea admitted that it was secretly developing nuclear weapons, which escalated the confrontation between the US and North Korea. Under this scenario, Russia chose to “take no side.” On the one hand, it showed respect for North Korea’s reasonable demand of ensuring national security; on the other hand, it expressed understanding of the US’s efforts in preventing nuclear proliferation and called on North Korea to abandon its nuclear program.

Since 2006, Russia has taken a stance of ensuring nuclear non-proliferation. It is unequivocally against North Korea’s nuclear tests, calls on the country to abandon its nuclear weapon development programs and implement nuclear freezing, and expresses willingness to offer North Korea technological assistance so that it uses nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and thus lead economic and social development to a normalized channel. However, Russia often exploits diplomatic means to block or delay new sanctions imposed on North Korea by the UN Security Council, or to oppose unilateral sanctions against the country. Since 2014, Russia started to condemn North Korea’s nuclear tests and missile launching in a stronger manner, claiming that its behaviors have endangered the global effort to contain weapons of mass destruction.

While the international community, Western countries and the US included, imposes more and more stringent sanctions on North Korea, Russia maintains a channel to provide the country with humanitarian assistance and economic and trade cooperation, and seeks to expand room for cooperation beyond the power of UN resolutions. In 2014, Russia’s parliament adopted an act that exempted North Korea from 90% of its historical debt, through which the obstacles hindering Russia-North Korea economic cooperation were ultimately removed. In April of the same year, Deputy Prime Minister of Russia and Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District Yury Trutnev visited North Korea, and offered it fire fighter trucks, grain, and drugs at no cost. Then in October, North Korean Foreign Minister Lee Su-yong paid a call on Russia, and was given 50,000 tons of grain for free. From 2014 to 2015, Russia has offered North Korea a total of nearly 100,000 tons of free wheat.

On March 1^st 2016, a day before the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2270, Russia delivered 2,500 tons of wheat to North Korea through the donation of UN World Food Programme (WFP), and confirmed the plan to introduce more North Korean labor forces to construct Russia’s Far East Advanced Special Economic Zone. As of now, there are over 30,000 North Korean laborers working in Russia. On May 17^th 2017, the North Korean passenger-cargo vessel Man Gyong Bong departed for the first time from the Rajin Port at Rason Special Economic Zone and arrived in Russia’s Vladivostok the next day, marking the opening of the first regular shipping lane between the two countries.

After North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test in September 2017, Russian President Putin declined Moon Jae-in’s requirement to enforce the petroleum embargo against North Korea, and stressed at the Eastern Economic Forum that if oil supply to North Korea were to be cut off, the lives of common people and the operation of hospitals and other institutions would be damaged. “Do not drive North Korea into a corner,” Putin warned.

After a period of mediation, the “marginalization” tendency of Russia’s status in the Korean Peninsula is now under control, and a rather systematic political, economic, and security architecture of its Korean Peninsula policies has been re-established. At its current stage, Russia takes a more proactive stance in making overall strategic arrangements with the Korean Peninsula, as a result of four major considerations.

Firstly, Russia does not want the peninsula to fall into chaos. A turbulent peninsula will harm the stability and development of the Far East region, and it creates an influx of refugees into Russia. Secondly, Russia hopes to take advantage of the strength of North Korea, South Korea, and China to maintain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula. In this way, Russia will have a chance to implement its agreements with North Korea on linking the Trans-Siberian Railway with the southern and northern part of the peninsula, renovating the railways connecting Incheon, South Korea, Chongkin, North Korea, and Vladivostok, Russia, introducing Russian oil and gas into the peninsula, helping North Korea transform its old industrial bases, taking advantage of North Korean labor to develop the Far East, and attracting more South Korean investment to Russia, to name but a few. Thirdly, Russia worries that a nuclear-armed North Korea may push Japan and South Korea to launch nuclear programs. Once the nuclear weapons and technologies of North Korea are possessed by international terrorists, the security interests of Russia will be harmed. Fourthly, Russia wants to prevent the US from the accelerated accumulation of strategic advantages in East Asia in the name of the North Korean nuclear issue. This is the core concern of Russia with security issues on the Korean Peninsula.[48]

At the current stage, Russia, under the leadership of Putin, is confronted with multiple problems, including a worsening relationship with the US, and a lack of resources to deal with the Korean Peninsula issue. Under this backdrop, and also propelled by the tendency of a closer comprehensive strategic partnership between Russia and China, Russia seems to be more proactive in strengthening policy communication and position coordination with China on Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia affairs, in the hope of supporting each other on relevant issues.

On July 4^th 2017, the Chinese and Russian foreign ministries issued a joint statement on the Korean Peninsula issue. “The Parties are putting forward a joint initiative based on the ideas proposed by China of a ‘suspension for suspension’ (of the DPRK’s nuclear and missile activities and the United States’ and the Republic of Korea’s large-scale joint military exercises) and a ‘dual-track approach’ to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment there of a mechanism for peace, and on the phased plan proposed by Russia for a resolution of the issues facing the Korean Peninsula.” The Parties affirm that the deployment of THAAD anti-missile defense systems in northeast Asia is extremely detrimental to the strategic security interests of States in the region, and urge the relevant countries to immediately halt and cancel the deployment. They have agreed to take the necessary steps to protect the security interests of the two countries and ensure strategic balance in the region.[49]

VI. Conclusions

Overall, the first three quarters of 2017 witnessed spiraling escalation of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, while the last quarter was relatively calm until the end of the year when it rebounded. North Korea did not carry out any obviously detectable missile or nuclear activities during the seventy-four days between the missile launch on September 15^th and the test of another intercontinental ballistic missile on November 29^th.

It is generally expected that the “calm” may result from three reasons. First, North Korea is unable to clearly identify the trend of Trump’s North Korea policy, and remains uncertain about China’s potential responses, thus needing time to further consider the situation. Secondly, due to the intense consumption of nuclear and missile materials and tightening external sanctions, North Korea must reduce the intensity of nuclear and missile activities. Thirdly, after its sixth nuclear test, two landslides, with a series of tremors, occurred at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site. This means that the mountains nearby have been heavily damaged after the underground nuclear tests conducted in recent years, and it needs to be evaluated whether the site can be used for any more tests. Meanwhile, it requires time to enable the alternate site.

However, the “calm” does not mean that North Korea is ready to halt its nuclear and missile programs. Instead, North Korea continues to demonstrate its unbending will to seek advances in its nuclear and missile technologies, and intends to push the process forward with more tests. In response to Trump’s threat of war against North Korea in his UNGA speech, Kim Jong-un released a statement as Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of North Korea, saying that he was considering “highest level of hardline countermeasure in history.” In this regard, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho, during his stay in New York for the UNGA, told reporters on September 23^rd that Kim’s earlier warning could mean “the most powerful detonation of an H-bomb in the Pacific.” In early morning on November 29^th, a “Hwasong-15” long-range ballistic missile was launched from the South Pyongan Province, North Korea, into the waters off the eastern coast of the Korean Peninsula. It was again fired on an elevated trajectory, reaching an altitude of around 4,500 km and travelling altogether 960 km downrange. Based on the two figures, it can be estimated that the missile’s engine could be shut down at around 7.2 km per second, and its operational range may reach 12,000 km if fired on a standard trajectory. Citing the Russian press, the website 38 North stated that there was continued activity at the shipyards in Sinpo, North Korea, which indicates that Pyongyang may be preparing for a new test of submarine-launched missiles, seeking to build up its marine nuclear force based on diesel-electric submarines, just as the Soviet Union did in the 1950s.[50]

On the same day that it completed the test fire of “Hwasong-15”, Pyongyang announced that: “It is the most powerful intercontinental ballistic missile which meets the goal of the completion of the rocket weaponry system development set by the DPRK,” and that “Kim Jong-un oversaw the successful launch of the ICBM, and proudly asserted that ‘now we have finally realized the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force, the cause of building a rocket power’.”

On December 8^th, the Guardian reported that, according to the Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, North Korea has expressed through Russia its hope of negotiations with the US, saying that it is open to “direct talks” with the US over the “nuclear standoff,” and seeks security assurances from Washington. Lavrov passed that message to his counterpart, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, when the two diplomats met in Vienna on December 7th. But there was no immediate response from Tillerson.

Around the time of the latest round of missile activities of North Korea, the US showed no sign of reducing sanction pressure or strategic deterrence.

From November 3^rd to 14^th 2017, Trump visited Japan, South Korea, and China, and attended the 25^th Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting in Vietnam and the East Asia Summit in the Philippines. The North Korean nuclear issue was a central topic during his Asia visit. Trump kept highlighting the global threats posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs; he also required East Asian countries to impose tighter economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation on North Korea, and prompted Russia to press North Korea to call off its programs.

On November 20^th, Trump put North Korea back on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism, which already includes Iran, Sudan, and Syria, saying that North Korea is not a country, but a terrorist group. On November 21^st, the US Department of Treasury slapped new sanctions on North Korea which targeted third-country persons with long-standing commercial ties with North Korea, as well as the transportation networks that facilitate North Korea’s revenue generation and operations. One individual, thirteen entities, and twenty vessels were added to its sanctions list, including Dandong Dongyuan Industrial Co., Ltd. and three other Chinese trading companies and a Chinese national.

From December 4^th to 8^th, the US and South Korea jointly launched the large-scale aerial drill “Vigilant Ace,” with around 240 aircraft deployed from 8 bases taking part.

The White House’s response to North Korea’s request for dialogue was rather obscure. On the Atlantic Council-Korea Foundation Forum held on December 12^th, when answering questions during his speech, Tillerson remarked that: “The most recent intercontinental ballistic missile test, I think, demonstrates they certainly have capability to continue to advance their program. … So we need the DPRK to come to the – come to the table for talks. We’re ready to talk anytime North Korea would like to talk, and we’re ready to have the first meeting without precondition…but they have to come to the table and they have to come to the table with a view that they do want to make a different choice. The US holds a clear stance against the North Korean nuclear issue, which is, demanding the Korean Peninsula to realize comprehensive and verifiable denuclearization. As of now, the maximum pressure it imposes on North Korea has delivered substantive results. Though the US Army remains vigilant at all times, diplomatic efforts will never stop until the last moment.”

However, during an interview with the press the next day, the White House National Security Council (NSC) official stated that, “The administration is united in insisting that any negotiations with North Korea must wait until the regime fundamentally improves its behavior,” And that “As the secretary of state himself has said, this must include, but is not limited to, no further nuclear or missile tests.” Furthermore, “given North Korea’s most recent missile test, clearly right now is not the time (for talks),” she noted, which negated Tillerson’s softened tone towards North Korea.

Following this, the US continued to press its allies and China to impose stricter restrictions and blockades on North Korea, including asking China to cut off oil supply to North Korea. In a series of negotiations on the United Nations Security Council, the US Ambassador Nikki Haley insisted that international sanctions have helped to disrupt 90% of North Korean trade and 30% of its oil import. However, as a result of Chinese support,  crude oil import remains unaffected. “China must cut off oil supply to North Korea.”

By officially affirming that the US will adhere to its hostile “maximum pressure” policy towards North Korea, the actions taken by the Trump administration deepened North Korea’s hostility to the US, and closed the “window of opportunity” for the resumption of talks on the North Korean nuclear issue at least for the rest of the year.

On December 22^nd, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2397, moderately imposing more stringent sanctions on North Korea. The resolution decreed  that the DPRK must cut the procurement of refined petroleum products from 2,000,000 barrels to 500,000 barrels during a period of twelve months beginning on January 1^st, 2018, and that for twelve months periods thereafter, the import of all crude oil must not exceed 4 million barrels aggregated per twelve-month period. The resolution also stated that the DPRK shall not supply, sell, or transfer food, agricultural products, machinery, and electrical equipment (the value of exports of relevant products is about USD 200 million), and reiterated that member states shall repatriate to the DPRK all its workers abroad within the given period. The resolution also stated that if the DPRK conducts a further nuclear test or a launch of a ballistic missile system capable of reaching intercontinental ranges, then the Security Council will “take action to restrict further the export to the DPRK of petroleum.” Trump welcomed the adoption of resolution, tweeting that “the world wants peace, not death.”

The development in the North Korean nuclear issue shows that it has entered a new stage. Based on how the issue has evolved previously, three possible futures are plausible: in the first, North Korea returns to the negotiating table under external pressure, and its nuclear and missile programs come to a standstill for a period of time; in the second one, the deadlock over the North Korean nuclear issue remains, and North Korea acquires nuclear capabilities amid heavy pressure from the international community, just as India and Pakistan did; in the third one, a crisis or military conflict occurs on the Korean Peninsula.

On April 30^th 2017, Fu Ying, the Chairperson of National People’s Congress Foreign Affairs Committee and Chief Expert of National Institute for Global Strategy at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, released a lengthy report titled The Korean Nuclear Issue: Past, Present, and Future—A Chinese Perspective through the US-based Brookings Institution. In the report, Fu offered an overview of how the North Korean Nuclear talks went, pointing out that the Six-Party Talks produced three documents, including the September 19^th Joint Statement, the February 13^th Joint Document, and the October 3^rd Joint Document—representing the maximum consensus among all parties and together providing a roadmap for a political solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. The disruption of the talks was due to a failure to implement agreements, and the nuclear issue has escalated in the absence of talks, resulting in a vicious cycle of US and UN sanctions followed by North Korean nuclear and missile tests. Looking ahead, Fu did not rule out the possibility of “endless delays,” which means that the pattern of intensifying sanctions and continued nuclear testing may remain until North Korean nuclear and missile technologies reach a “tipping point.” She also noted that, as North Korea’s nuclear and missile technologies have been developed step by step, the ground has shifted and the basis for negotiation has changed significantly since 2003 when the Six-Party Talks were launched. If talks are resumed, whether all parties can accept the new circumstances and restart negotiations without preconditions will be an important factor determining the success of talks.

 If the historical logic still applies, we can make the following judgment on the development of the North Korean nuclear issue in the next period to come.

(I) There would be no turning back for North Korea—it is determined to overcome all obstructions and become a de facto nuclear power. North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are aimed at ensuring the country’s security and strengthening its bargaining position to discuss the future of the Korean Peninsula directly with the US. This ultimate goal demonstrates North Korea’s core interests, thus transcending all difficulties and pressure that its nuclear and missile programs may face. Sanctions have limitations: it’s difficult to realize political and security goals with economic measures. As such, more political and security approaches are called for.

(II) In dealing with North Korean nuclear and missile issues, the Trump administration has always either passively waited for change or attempted to effect change by pressuring North Korea, an approach which has long been in use by the US government. Evidently, the US President is unlikely to renounce his government’s ultimate goal of changing the North Korean system and regime; moreover, the US is bent on using China to pressure North Korea to disarm, transferring the heavy burden to China. This attitude indicates that the US is lacking sincerity in its commitment to settle the North Korean nuclear issue.

(III) The US military preparations against North Korea are underway, but chances that the US would wage war against North Korea in the near future are slim. For one thing, the Trump administration always emphasizes its “America First” policy, and, instead of igniting conflict overseas, concentrates on domestic affairs. For another, any military means used against North Korea would deliver unpredictable and uncontrollable results, be it a limited military strike, a substantial military conflict, or a full-scale war. Meanwhile, the US believes that the existing sanctions have not exhausted the ways to pressure North Korea in both economic and political terms, and that China and Russia can play a bigger role in it.

However, as further changes occur in the domestic political landscapes in the US, it is possible that the situation may imminently worsen, provided that North Korea continues conducting nuclear and missile tests which would further irritate the international community and potentially cause major military conflicts on the Korean Peninsula or between North Korea and the US or its ally Japan in Northeast Asia, especially in the latter half of Trump’s term of office when he must satisfy domestic political needs to seek reelection. The underlying trend seems to indicate that the North Korean nuclear issue will be settled by force.

(IV) Although the denuclearization of the peninsula seems to have reached a dead end, all parties involved, except North Korea, are still heading towards the same direction, leaving aside all their differing interests and views on the North Korean nuclear issue. There is still hope for a peaceful resolution.

North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons may set off a chain reaction of consequences: South Korea and Japan may too, decide to have their own nuclear weapons, thus making Asia “a nuclear jungle” and seriously threatening the international nuclear nonproliferation structure. From this perspective alone, the views of those who believe that nations will tend to acquiesce are not legitimate even in nominal terms.

(V) China’s impacts on North Korea are still very limited. This can be attributed to the fact that, at present, the two countries follow fundamentally different strategies on the nuclear issue, hold different views on development paths and governance modes, and even have different judgments on the world today. During this past year, the China-South Korea relations suffered a severe regress due to the issue of THAAD deployment. Even till now the two countries find it difficult to work together. In China, when it comes to the origin of the North Korean nuclear issue, countermeasures to be taken, and proper solutions, opinions differ at least in terms of public awareness. As a result, China wields far less influence on North Korea and contributes unsatisfactorily to mediation concerning the North Korean nuclear issue. Facts have shown that, to play a special role on this issue, China must maintain basically good relations with all parties directly involved in the issue.

(VI) The pattern of the North Korean nuclear issue has been unprecedentedly complicated. The contradiction between North Korea and the US can be considered the core contradiction of the issue. Of course, the delicate, intricate, and even competitive and hostile relations between China and the US, Russia and the US, China and North Korea, as well as North Korea and South Korea have profound impacts on the development of the issue. In addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, as North Korea-US dialogues are the most meaningful, and China-US coordination the most critical, the role of Russia is notably on the rise. Boasting a nuclear arsenal and tremendous geopolitical strategic space, Russia considers the issue as a peripheral one. It’s apparent that North Korea is taking advantage of the interest and cognitive differences between China, the US, and Russia to promote its nuclear programs. Despite the deterrence of recent China-US cooperation, if the three countries cannot reach a consensus, and “instrumentalize” the North Korean nuclear issue, the concert of great powers may be futile.

China proposes that, as a first step, North Korea should suspend its missile and nuclear activities in exchange for a halt in large-scale US-South Korean exercises; meanwhile, the international community can follow the dual-track approach of denuclearizing the peninsula and establishing a peace mechanism. The proposal’s design is based on China’s experience in the Six-Party Talks and mediating the North Korean nuclear issue over the years. It exhibits, at its core, the principles provided in the September 19 Joint Statement at the conclusion of the fourth round of Six-Party Talks in 2005, and the previous consensus reached by all parties. More importantly, the dual-track approach also provides basic insight into the issue: apart from sanctions and pressure, talks and negotiations will also be involved in the efforts to settle the issue— to put it more clearly, a peaceful settlement via talks shall be the only option.

China must sort out its interests and values regarding the issue as soon as possible, and establish a policy with national interests, people’s wellbeing, and the merits of the issue in mind. The policy should not be categorically idealistic, nor a completely realistic one; it should not be taken out of its historical context, nor trapped in the country’s past. China’s interests may not be the only consideration, but the policy must not ignore China’s interests for the sake of internationalism. Certainly, it should not go against the advancement of human civilization or undermine the globally shared desire for peace and security.

Just as Fu Ying noted in The Korean Nuclear Issue: Past, Present, and Future, when it comes to the North Korean nuclear issue, China’s interest lies in ensuring a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, and preventing the disruption of peace and security in Northeast Asia and the whole of the Asia Pacific. China’s responsibility is to play a proactive role in achieving the above objectives through peaceful means, and to help bring about a peace accord, thus creating lasting peace and enabling greater cooperation in the region. China should also be firm in preventing any major turbulence or even conflict on the Peninsula. Only through dialogue can mutual security be achieved. In this way, we may help wrestle the Korean Peninsula out of its current vicious cycle and prevent Northeast Asia from turning into a “Dark Forest.”

 This report is a sponsored project of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and a contribution to the series of books on international strategic studies—China’s Regional Security Environment Review: 2017 (Eds by Zhang Jie). Finished on November 30^th 2017, and updated on December 30^th, the book is to be published by Social Sciences Academic Press in early 2018. And this article is also the outcome of the research project at China Center for International Economic Exchanges